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Government neutrality toward religion is based on
familiar considerations: the importance of avoiding
religious conflict, alienation of religious minorities, and
the danger that religious considerations will introduce a
dangerous irrational dogmatism into politics and make
democratic compromise more difficult. This paper explores
one consideration, prominent at the time of the framing,
that is often overlooked: the idea that religion can be
corrupted by state involvement with it. This idea is
friendly to religion but, precisely for that reason, is
determined to keep the state away from religion.
If the religion-protective argument for
disestablishment is to be useful today, it cannot be
adopted in the form in which it was understood in the 17th
and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded with
assumptions rooted in a particular variety of Protestant
Christianity. Nonetheless, suitably revised, it provides a
powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to
keep its hands off religious doctrine. It offers the best
explanation for many otherwise mysterious rules of
Establishment Clause law.
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Laws, especially those with ambiguous language, are
interpreted in light of their purposes.1

The Establishment

Clause of the First Amendment, which states that “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,”
is an example.

One of its core purposes was to prevent the

corruption and degradation of religion that the framers
associated with religious establishments.

The Clause, the

Court has said, “stands as an expression of principle on
the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion
is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”2

This

rationale has been neglected in modern Establishment Clause
theory, but it can explain and justify the shape of our law
better than the prevention of division along religious
lines or of alienation, which are the themes that dominate
contemporary thought about disestablishment.
The corruption rationale has a problem, however.

It

cannot be imported without modification into modern
jurisprudence.

Any notion of “corruption,” “degradation,”

or “perversion” implies a norm or ideal state from which
the degradation or perversion is a falling off.

That

1

This is a commonplace of statutory interpretation. See 2A Norman J.
Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §
45:9 (7th ed. 2007).
2
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting James Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. As will be
detailed below, this historical claim is accurate.

3

paradoxically raises establishment clause problems of its
own.
A claim that “we ought not to do A, because that is
bad for B,” implies that (1) B is a good thing, and that
(2) we can tell what is good and what is bad for B.

Thus,

any invocation of the corruption rationale presupposes that
religion is a good thing and that we can tell what is good
and what is bad for religion.

For example, the framers’

understanding of the corruption rationale relied on
Protestant or Deist understandings of what uncorrupted
religion consisted in. No court today could embrace those
understandings without engaging in precisely the kind of
intervention in live theological controversy that the
Clause was intended to forestall.

This difficulty has

received almost no attention,3 but it poses a fundamental
challenge to the coherence of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
This Article will elucidate the difficulty and show
how it can be answered.

The framers’ specific idea of the

“religion” that must be protected from corruption has been
supplanted by a different idea of religion, one which
3

The only extended treatment of the problem of which I am aware is John
Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 L. & Contemp. Probs. 23
(1949), discussed infra text accompanying notes 242-247. It is noted
in Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution: Establishment and
Fairness 493 (2008), and may explain the caution with which he deploys
the corruption argument.
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resists definition yet is quite clear in application.
There is, in contemporary American culture, a proliferation
of different understandings of the good of religion.

Yet

despite this proliferation, we generally know religion when
we see it.

Many people who are divided by these

understandings converge on the idea that the object of
their contestation will be damaged and degraded by state
interference with it.

Thus clarified, the corruption

rationale can explain many otherwise mysterious aspects of
modern Establishment Clause law – notably, the peculiar
rule, which has recently been formally stated for the first
time, that older acknowledgements of ceremonial deism are
probably constitutional, while newer ones will be
invalidated.

It also offers a new justification for that

law – one that is not really new, since it has been around
for 350 years, but which has been obscured by the neoRawlsian approach which is now so prominent in contemporary
writing on religious liberty.
Part I of this essay explores the gap in contemporary
constitutional theory, and how the corruption argument can
remedy it.

Part II examines the way in which the

corruption argument depends on a claim that religion is, in
some way, a good thing.

It also shows why this claim is

hard to cognize from within the framework of neo-Rawlsian

5

political theory.

Part III describes the classic

formulations of the claim, primarily by the founding
generation.

Part IV enumerates the central claims of the

corruption thesis, showing how those claims are closely
tied to its religious roots, and thus apparently presenting
an insuperable Establishment Clause obstacle to a court’s
making those claims.

It also shows the failure of Justice

Antonin Scalia’s attempt to resolve this difficulty.

Part

V proposes a revision of the idea that separates it from
its Protestant roots.

Part VI responds to objections

(including Rawlsian ones) to that proposal.

Part VII shows

how the reformulation offered here makes sense of the law.

I.

The Gap in Establishment Clause Theory

Consider some familiar and well-settled rules of
Establishment Clause law.

The state may not engage in

speech that endorses a particular religion, or religion
generally.4

It may not use a religious test for office.5

A

law is invalid if it lacks a secular legislative purpose,6
or if it purposefully discriminates against certain

4

See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
6
See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002), and
cases discussed therein.
5

6

religious practices.7

Laws may not discriminate among

religions.8
A theme that runs through this area of the law is the
state’s incompetence to decide matters that relate to the
interpretation of religious practice or belief.

The state

may not attempt to determine the “truth or falsity” of
religious claims,9 courts may not try to resolve
“controversies over religious doctrine and practice,”10 may
not undertake “interpretation of particular church
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the
religion,”11 may make “no inquiry into religious doctrine,”12
and may give “no consideration of doctrinal matters,
whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of
faith.”13
Yet at the same time, there is a broad range of
official religious practices that are tolerated.

“In God

We Trust” appears on the currency, legislative sessions
begin with prayers, judicial proceedings begin with “God
save the United States and this Honorable Court,”
Thanksgiving and Christmas are official holidays, and, of
7

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
9
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
10
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
11
Id. at 450.
12
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership
v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
13
Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring).
8
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course, the words “under God” appear in the Pledge of
Allegiance.

The boundaries of this permitted “ceremonial

deism” are unclear.

Prayers in school are

unconstitutional, but not a moment of silence.

The Court’s

most recent set of decisions is particularly confusing,
holding that an official Ten Commandments display is
unconstitutional if it was erected recently, but not if it
has been around for decades.14
Any account of the Establishment Clause needs to
explain these apparent inconsistencies.

One can write them

off as unprincipled compromises, and many have.15

But it is

possible to do better than that.
The Establishment Clause has multiple purposes,16 so
any argument about the basis of the Clause is going to be
14

See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)(invalidating
recently erected display); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(upholding 40-year-old display). Justice Breyer, the only judge in the
majority in both cases, relied on the divisiveness rationale in
explaining his position. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700-04 (Breyer,
J., concurring). I will argue here that there are better grounds for
his position than the ones he states.
15
Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 155, 223-231 (2004); Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 86-87,
95-102; Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden,
McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 5 First Amend. L. Rev. 59 (2006). Some writers have
suggested that the entire body of Establishment Clause law reflects
this kind of unprincipled compromise. See Noah Feldman, Divided By
God: America’s Church-State Problem – And What We Should Do About It
216 (2005); Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Rhetoric of Church and State:
A Critical Analysis of Religion Clause Jurisprudence (1995); Phillip
Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine,
72 Calif. L. Rev. 817 (1984).
16
See Greenawalt, supra note 3, at 6-13; Steven H. Shiffrin, The
Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 9,
34-54 (2004).
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about what to emphasize.

Two accounts of the purposes of

the Establishment Clause dominate contemporary theory.

One

of these, whose leading proponent was Chief Justice Warren
Burger, focuses on political division.

The other,

principally articulated by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
focuses on alienation.

Doubtless these concerns are among

those that underlie the Establishment Clause.

But a theory

that makes them central cannot explain or justify the
specific rules of law described above.
A.

The political division theory

Burger argued that a state program could be
unconstitutional because of its “divisive political
potential.”17

This mattered because “political division

along religious lines was one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to
protect.”18

Such division constituted a “threat to the

normal political process” and could “divert attention from
the myriad issues and problems that confront every level of
government.”19

17
18
19

The argument has often been invoked in

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
Id.
Id. at 622, 623.

9

Supreme Court opinions, though it is unclear that it has
done any analytical work in deciding cases.20
The most fundamental defect with this argument, as a
basis for any constitutional rule, is that political
division is an unavoidable part of life in a democracy.
This division will frequently take the form of religious
division.21

It is not clear why division along religious

lines is worse than religion along lines of race, gender,
age, ethnicity, or economic class.22

As a standard for

constitutionality, the division criterion is not
administrable:

it is impossible for a court to predict

which measures will cause political division.23

Moreover,

the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause decisions
themselves have been causes of political division; its
decisions to invalidate prayer and Bible reading in the

20

For a thorough catalogue of examples, see Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 Geo. L. J. 1667 (2006).
The argument has a large scholarly following. See, e.g., Robert Audi,
Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (2000); Douglas Laycock,
Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313 (1996); Ira
C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the
Religion Clauses, 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 357 (1996); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 195 (1992).
21
Religious division has in fact been a basis for political division
throughout American history. See A. James Reichley, Religion in
American Public Life (1985). These divisions have remained manageable,
not because of judicial intervention, but because the proliferation of
religious factions has prevented any of them from gaining ascendancy.
See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the
Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine that Has Gone of Itself,
37 Case W. L. Rev. 674 (1987).
22
See generally Garnett, supra note 20.
23
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1278-84 (2d ed. 1988).
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public schools have been very unpopular.

If the aim is to

avoid division, then the law has been counterproductive.

B.

The alienation theory

A second theory, championed by Justice O’Connor, is
concerned with preventing a certain kind of political
alienation. “The Establishment Clause prohibits government
from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to
a person's standing in the political community.”24
Government may not take action that endorses a particular
religious view, because this “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.”25

This criterion, O’Connor argues, is

better able than any rival conception to “adequately
protect the religious liberty [and] respect the religious
diversity of the members of our pluralistic political
community.”26

24

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)(O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
25
Id. at 688.
26
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989)(O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This argument also
has a large scholarly following. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber &
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It is not clear, however, how endorsement either
threatens religious liberty or fails to respect diversity.
Endorsement as such is purely symbolic.

It does not

restrict religious liberty in any tangible way.27

As for

respect for diversity, several commentators have noted that
it is not clear how endorsement is inconsistent with it.
[I]t is not clear why symbolic exclusion should matter
so long as

"nonadherents" are in fact actually

included in the political community. Under those
circumstances, nonadherents who believe that they are
excluded from the political community are merely
expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has
lost a fair fight in the arena of politics.28

Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution 61-62, 122
(2007); Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. Va.
L. Rev. 1 (2007); Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of Ceremonial Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1996). Many writers draw
on both arguments. Thus, for example, Noah Feldman relies on the
danger of political division to argue for an absolute rule against
public funding for religious activities, while he relies on an
alienation rationale for permitting government sponsored religious
displays and prayers. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 14-16. He is
aware that his proposals present their own dangers of division and
alienation, but does not explain how he knows how to quantify the
magnitudes on each side – how, for example, he knows that secularists’s
“concerns over exclusion cannot effectively trump the sense of
exclusion shared by the many Americans who want to express their
religious values through politics.” Id. at 16.
27
See Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental
Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment
Clause Doctrine, 40 DePaul L. Rev. 53, 65 (1990).
28
Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 701, 712
(1986). See also Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86
Mich. L. Rev. 266, 307 (1987); David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious
and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to Professor
Perry, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 1067 (1991).
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To ask that no one be alienated from the results of
political decisionmaking is to ask too much.

In a

pluralistic culture, alienation is inevitable.

“[S]ome

beliefs must, but not all beliefs can, achieve recognition
and ratification in the nation’s laws and public policies;
and those whose positions are not so favored will sometimes
feel like outsiders.”29

Once more, judicial intervention

may simply make things worse.

Finally, the focus on

alienation distorts the Establishment Clause, transforming
it from a prescription about institutional arrangements
into a kind of individual right, a right not to feel like
an “outsider.”30
In short, both the division theory and the alienation
suffer from the same defect.

The pathology each seeks to

prevent is in fact not preventable.

Division and

alienation will happen no matter what courts do.

It is not

clear why these effects, however regrettable they may be,
are worse when they are connected with religion.
More particularly, the Establishment Clause rules
discussed above cannot prevent division and alienation.

On

the contrary, they have sometimes exacerbated these
problems.

Because division and alienation are so

ubiquitous in politics, they do not provide a reason to
29
30

Smith, supra note 28, at 313.
Id. at 300.
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single out religion for special treatment:

why is this

kind of division and alienation especially bad?

If these

are the purposes that Establishment Clause law is supposed
to serve, then the whole body of law is radically
misconceived and should be abandoned.

C.

The comparative strength of the corruption argument

The corruption argument can clear up these puzzles.
It is not possible to prevent division and alienation.
it is possible to keep government away from religion.

But
All

the rules we considered at the beginning are well tailored
to do that.

They all prevent government from deciding

religious questions.

Even the sanctioning of ceremonial

deism prevents government from deciding religious
questions:

old ceremonies, which were broadly ecumenical

at the time that they were enacted, are allowed to remain,
but they are frozen in place.

No new theological decisions

are allowed to be made.
The idea that religion can be damaged and degraded by
state involvement with it has nearly disappeared from
contemporary Establishment Clause theory.

The neglect is

apparent, for example, in Frederick Gedicks’s (in many ways

14

excellent and insightful) analysis of the Supreme Court’s
treatment of religion.

Gedicks thinks that the Court is

nominally committed to principles of secular individualism,
which are suspicious of and hostile toward religion, while
much of the country is devoted to a very different ethic,
“religious communitarianism,” which permits the community
to define itself and its goals in expressly religious
terms, and which exerts a gravitational pressure of its own
on constitutional interpretation.

Contemporary doctrine,

Gedicks thinks, is an incoherent congeries of these
incompatible elements.31

His work articulates widely shared

assumptions about the character of contemporary
controversies.32

However, he omits an important middle

view, one that is friendly to religion but, precisely for
that reason, is determined to keep the state away from
religion.

It is associated with the most prominent early

proponents of toleration and disestablishment, including
Milton, Roger Williams, Locke, Pufendorf, Elisha Williams,
Backus, Jefferson, Paine, Leland, and Madison.

31

See Gedicks, supra note 15.
Noah Feldman draws a similar contrast, between the legal views of
“legal secularists” and “values evangelicals.” Feldman, supra note 15,
at 6-8. His omission of religiously based separatism from his
diagnosis is noted in Perry Dane, Separation Anxiety, 22 J. L. &
Religion 545 (2007), and Darryl Hart, A Secular Faith: Why
Christianity Favors the Separation of Church and State 14-15 (2006).

32
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The omission of this view makes the controversy over
the meaning of the establishment clause more polarizing
than it needs to be.

If any interpretive question simply

turns on a choice between secular individualism and
religious communitarianism, then in any establishment
clause controversy, the state is taking sides between the
forces of progressivism and religious traditionalism – in
other words, it is adjudicating the bitterest issues of
theological controversy that divide American religion.33
There is no middle ground between the two views, and
compromise is impossible.
The corruption argument is important, because it
offers a way to reframe the rhetoric of the establishment
clause in a way that could moderate these tensions and make
it possible to find common ground.
If the religion-protective argument for
disestablishment is to be useful today, however, it cannot
be adopted in the form in which it was understood in the
17th and 18th centuries, because in that form it is loaded
with assumptions rooted in a particular variety of
Protestant Christianity.

Nonetheless, suitably revised, it

33

See Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion 218-22
(1988); James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define
America (1991).
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provides a powerful reason for government, as a general
matter, to keep its hands off religious doctrine.

II.

“Corruption” and the free exercise/establishment
dilemma

Charles Taylor observes that there are three different
strategies by which modern political philosophy has tried
to cope with religious diversity.

One, the “common ground

strategy,” seeks to establish political ethics on the basis
of premises shared across different confessional
allegiances:
believe.34

what all Christians, or even all theists,

The difficulty with this approach is that as

pluralism grows, the common ground shrinks.

The universal

sentiments of Christendom aren’t as universal as they once
seemed.

A second understanding, the “independent political

ethic” strategy, seeks to abstract away from all our
disagreements to something that is independent of them.
The aim is to infer, from certain fundamental preconditions
of modern political life, conclusions about how political
life should be organized.35

Pluralism has also created a

34

Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in Secularism and Its Critics 33
(Rajeev Bhargava, ed., 1998).
35
Taylor observes that Grotius was an early explorer of this avenue:
“We look for certain features of the human condition which allow us to
deduce certain exceptionless norms, including those of peace and

17

problem for this approach:

we may want to ignore God only

for political purposes, but if there are real live atheists
in the society, then the state, by endorsing an ethic that
is independent of religion, may appear to be taking their
side on fundamental issues.

The difficulties of both of

these approaches, Taylor thinks, create the case for
“overlapping consensus,” which does not seek any agreement
about foundations, but only acceptance of certain political
principles.
Taylor borrows the term “overlapping consensus” from
John Rawls, but by it he means something considerably
shallower, and therefore less necessarily commited to
neutrality toward contested ideas of the good.

Taylor

thinks that “Rawls still tries to hold on to too much of
the older independent ethic.”36

Rawls expects citizens not

only to endorse a set of political principles, but also to
accept a doctrine of political constructivism and just
terms of cooperation.
ask.

This, Taylor thinks, is too much to

As a schedule of rights, political liberalism for

Taylor may suggest an independent political ethic, but this
ethic will inevitably be interpreted in light of any

political obedience. Grotius would appear at times to be arguing
almost more geometrico.” Id.
36
Id. at 51.

18

interpreter’s comprehensive view, and so will partake of
the common ground strategy.
The regime of religious neutrality we actually have in
the United States today resembles overlapping consensus as
Taylor (but not Rawls) understands it.
supposed to be neutral toward religion.

The state is
But at the same

time, religion is treated as something so important that
even political values are sometimes sacrificed for its
sake.

This treatment of religion as a good is not a result

that could be reached from within Rawlsian constructivism.37
Neutrality in American law is based on a very abstract
understanding of the common ground.

Because a Rawlsian

approach excludes a common ground strategy, contemporary
neo-Rawlsians have understandably had difficulty
acknowledging the common ground elements of the present
regime.38
Federal law and the law of every state sometimes grant
exemptions from laws, laws that presumably serve some valid
purpose, when the laws place a burden on the free exercise

37

See infra text accompanying notes 360-371.
Prominent among these are Martha Nussbaum, Christopher Eisgruber, and
Lawrence Sager. See Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In
Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (2008); Eisgruber
& Sager, supra note 26. Both are critiqued in Andrew Koppelman, Is It
Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 571;
Rawls and Nussbaum are further engaged infra text accompanying notes
360-371.

38
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of religion.39

This cannot be justified by a purely

political ethic, which either would accommodate religion
only when the power or stubbornness of the pertinent
religious group makes that prudent, would purge politics of
religion altogether because religion is irrational and
dangerous, or would make religious ideas a tool of politics
whenever that seemed convenient.40
The accommodation of religion gives rise to a puzzle
in First Amendment theory:

how to reconcile free exercise

with establishment principles.

The Court has declared that

“[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church.

Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid

all religions, or prefer one religion over another.”41

The

Establishment Clause “mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.”42

But the Court has also acknowledged that

“the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives
special protection to the exercise of religion.”43

It is

39

For a survey of statutes and court decisions adopting the rule, see
Laycock, supra note 15, at 211-12 & nn.368-73. For a survey of
situations in which the rule is applied, see 1 Kent Greenawalt,
Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise and Fairness (2006).
40
These were the positions taken by the purely political views that
were held the time of the founding. See John Witte, Jr., Religion and
the American Constitutional Experiment 29-35 (2d ed. 2005).
41
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
42
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
43
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); see also Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n one
important respect, the Constitution is not neutral on the subject of
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not logically possible for the government both to be
neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give
religion special protection.

Some justices and many

commentators have therefore regarded the First Amendment as
in tension with itself.44

Call this the free

exercise/establishment dilemma.
The solution to the dilemma, I have argued in earlier
writings,45 is that the government is permitted to treat
religion as a valuable thing, but only if “religion” is
understood at such a high level of abstraction that the
state is forbidden from endorsing any theological
proposition, even the existence of God.

Accommodation is

religion: Under the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims
of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other
strongly held beliefs do not.”).
The privileged status of religion is somewhat diminished after
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that
there is no right to religious exemptions from laws of general
applicability. Even after Smith, however, religions retain some special
protection that nonreligious beliefs do not share. In Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court
struck down four ordinances that a city had enacted with the avowed
purpose of preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal
sacrifice. The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment because their object was the suppression of a
religious practice. Id. at 542, 547. The result would have been
different if the law had targeted a club that did exactly what the
Santeria did, not as part of a religious ritual, but because its
members thought that killing animals was fun.
44
As the Court put it recently, “the two Clauses . . . often exert
conflicting pressures.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
45
Koppelman, supra note 38; Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious
Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003);
Koppelman, supra note 6; Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman,
Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, On
the Moral Foundations of Legal Expressivism, 60 MD. L. REV. 777 (2001);
and Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 33 U.
RICH. L. REV. 393 (1999).
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permissible so long as government does not discriminate, in
its accommodations, between theistic and nontheistic
religions.

I will discuss this argument in more detail in

the conclusion.

This paper will argue that the explanatory

power of the corruption argument is further evidence that
my account is correct.
The corruption argument, I have already noted, rests
on a core assumption that religion is valuable and that
neutrality exists in order to protect it.

This is apparent

in the Court’s most extensive statement of the corruption
argument.

In a decision invalidating a state’s imposition

of a nonsectarian, state-composed prayer to be read in
public schools, the Court explained:
[The] first and most immediate purpose [of the
Establishment Clause] rested on the belief that a
union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and to degrade religion. The history of
governmentally established religion, both in England
and in this country, showed that whenever government
had allied itself with one particular form of
religion, the inevitable result had been that it had
incurred the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of
those who held contrary beliefs. That same history
showed that many people had lost their respect for any
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religion that had relied upon the support for
government to spread its faith. The Establishment
Clause thus stands as an expression of principle on
the part of the Founders of our Constitution that
religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil
magistrate.46
The Court makes two arguments here.

The first is a

contingent sociological claim, that establishment tends to
produce negative attitudes toward the “particular form” of
religion that is established.

The second runs much deeper.

In the final sentence, the Court claims that there is
something fundamentally impious about establishment.
breaches the “sacred” and the “holy.”

It

It is remarkable to

find such prophetic language in the U.S. Reports, but it
has appeared there repeatedly,47 especially in opinions

46

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
47
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 608 (1992)(Blackmun, J.,
concurring)(“The favored religion may be compromised as political
figures reshape the religion’s beliefs for their own purposes; it may
be reformed as government largesse brings government regulation.”);
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 645 (1989)(Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)(“The government-sponsored
display of the menorah alongside a Christmas tree also works a
distortion of the Jewish religious calendar. . . . the city's erection
alongside the Christmas tree of the symbol of a relatively minor Jewish
religious holiday . . . has the effect of promoting a Christianized
version of Judaism.”); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 n.10
(1988)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(“The First Amendment protects not only
the State from being captured by the Church, but also protects the
Church from being corrupted by the State and adopted for its
purposes.”); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-10 (1985)(Brennan,
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written by Justice Hugo Black, the principal architect of
modern Establishment Clause theory.48
The most prominent contemporary proponent of this view
is Justice David Souter.

In four dissenting opinions, two

of which were signed by one vote short of a majority of the
Justices, and one concurrence, he has invoked the
corruption argument as a reason for maintaining a strict
rule that the state may not provide aid to religion in any
form, even in a neutral program that does not aid religion
as such.49

I will examine Souter’s arguments in Part V.

J.)(“When the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in
matters of religious significance . . . the freedom of even the
adherents of the denomination is limited by the governmental intrusion
into sacred matters.”); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373, 385 (1985)(Brennan, J.)(favored religions may be “taint[ed] . . .
with a corrosive secularism.”); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Board,
426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(noting “the
pernicious tendency of a state subsidy to tempt religious schools to
compromise their religious mission without wholly abandoning it.”);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 (1963)(Brennan, J.,
concurring)(“It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection of
sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil polity, but in as
high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of a
creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the
government.”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 59 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., dissenting)(“we have staked the very existence of our
country on the faith that complete separation between the state and
religion is best for the state and best for religion.”).
48
See infra text accompanying notes 216-247.
49
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711-12 (2002)(Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(Establishment
Clause aims “to save religion from its own corruption,” and “the
specific threat is to the primacy of the schools' mission to educate
the children of the faithful according to the unaltered precepts of
their faith”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 871-72 (2000)(Souter,
J., joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)(“government aid
corrupts religion”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243
(1997)(Souter, J., joined in this part of his opinion by Stevens and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting)(“religions supported by governments are
compromised just as surely as the religious freedom of dissenters is
burdened when the government supports religion.”); Rosenberger v. Univ.
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III.

The classic formulations of the claim

As noted earlier, any notion of “corruption” or
“perversion” implies a norm or ideal state from which the
corruption or perversion is a falling off.50

A claim that

“we ought not to do A, because that is bad for B,” implies
that (1) B is a good thing, and that (2) we can tell what
is good and what is bad for B.

Thus, the Court’s claim

presents, in a different form than accommodation, the same
problem:

it presupposes that religion is a good thing and

that we can tell what is good and what is bad for religion.

of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 891 (1995)(Souter, J., joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)(“the Establishment Clause . . .
was meant not only to protect individuals and their republics from the
destructive consequences of mixing government and religion, but to
protect religion from a corrupting dependence on support from the
Government”); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 615 (1992)(Souter, J.,
joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ., concurring)(quoting with approval
Madison’s statement that “religion & Govt. will both exist in greater
purity, the less they are mixed together.” Letter from J. Madison to E.
Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 5 The Founders' Constitution, at 105,
106); id. at 627 (quoting the same passage again, and citing the
importance of “protecting religion from the demeaning effects of any
governmental embrace.”). Perhaps one should also count his dissent in
Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007), which
quotes with approval Justice Black’s statement that the framers thought
“individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government
which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to
assist any or all religions.” Id. at 2588 (Souter, J., joined by
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting), quoting Everson v. Bd.
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947).
50
Vincent Blasi has noted that ideas of corruption or distortion of
religion “are meaningless in the absence of a baseline.” School
Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783, 798 (2002).
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These claims made perfect sense at the time of the
founding.

They played a large role in the movement toward

disestablishment.

But they depend on contestable

theological claims.
The claim’s basis is at least as ancient as Jesus
Christ’s insistence on distinguishing the things that are
Caesar’s from the things that are God’s.51
during the period of the founding.

It was pervasive

Here I will focus on

its leading expositors, but variations on the claim appear
in much popular rhetoric of the time.52

A.

Precursors

The generation that enacted the Establishment Clause
did not invent the corruption argument.
for over a century.

It had been around

Here we consider the most prominent

early statements of the argument.

51

Mark 12:17; Matthew 22:21; Luke 20:25. Other early Christian
formulations of the separation claim are briefly described in John
Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 1869,
1876-86 (2003), and Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State
21-38 (2002). For earlier English and American Protestant
formulations, see Thomas G. Sanders, Protestant Concepts of Church and
State: Historical Backgrounds and Approaches for the Future 184-202
(1965).
52
For examples, see Hamburger, supra note 51, at 5 n.7, 55, 74-75, 12122, 124, 170-71; Leonard W. Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion
and the First Amendment 64-67, 124 (1986; 2d ed. 1994); Thomas J.
Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage
of the First Amendment 130, 144, 156, 168 (1986).
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i.

John Milton

The corruption argument against establishment emerged
roughly simultaneously in England and America.

We will

begin with Milton, because he was writing against
establishment in its classic form.

The central elements of

the English religious establishment were government control
over the doctrines, structure, and liturgy of the state
church; mandatory attendance at the religious worship
services of the state church; public financial support of
the state church; prohibition of religious worship in other
denominations; the use of the state church for civil
functions; and the limitation of political participation to
members of the state church.53

There was also a restriction

of the dissemination of heretical doctrines by means, inter
alia, of licensing of the press:

it was illegal to publish

anything without prior permission of the Crown.
Milton was opposed to all of these, but attacked
different strands of the Establishment in different
writings.

In Areopagitica, Milton argued for the

abandonment of licensing.

This, he admitted, would allow

53

Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
2105 (2003).
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the proliferation of heretical religious doctrines, and so
undermine the established church’s monopoly over religious
opinion.
Milton insisted that even correct religious doctrine
would not bring about salvation if it was the consequence
of blind conformity rather than active engagement with
religious questions.

“A man may be a heretic in the truth;

and if he believe things only because his pastor says so,
or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other
reason, though his belief be true, yet the very truth he
holds becomes his heresy.”54

Religious salvation was to be

achieved only by struggle against temptation.

“Assuredly

we bring not innocence into the world, we bring impurity
much rather: that which purifies us is trial, and trial is
by what is contrary.”55

It follows that “all opinions, yea

errors, known, read, and collated, are of main service and
assistance toward the speedy attainment of what is
truest.”56

54
John Milton, Areopagitica (1644), in Complete Poems and Major Prose
739 (Merritt Y. Hughes ed. 1957).
55
Id. at 728.
56
Id. at 727. The importance of a free choice between good and evil is
likewise emphasized in Paradise Lost, Book III, lines 102ff, in
Collected Poems and Major Prose at 260. The speaker here is God the
Father, explaining why it was right to allow the rebel angels and,
later, Adam to transgress:
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere
Of true allegiance, constant Faith or Love,
Where only what they needs must do, appear’d,
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The truth did not need state assistance to prevail:
“And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to
play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do
injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew
Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter.”57
The state, moreover, is likely to err in deciding what
ideas to restrict:

“if it come to prohibiting, there is

not aught more likely to be prohibited than truth itself;
whose first appearance to our eyes bleared and dimmed with
prejudice and custom, is more unsightly and unplausible
than many errors.”58

Even if errors can be prevented by

coercion, “God sure esteems the growth and completing of
one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten
vicious.”59
What matters is not outward conformity, but adherence
to the inner light.

All that coercion can produce is “the

forced and outward union of cold and neutral and inwardly
divided minds.”60

57
58
59
60

On the other hand, the pluralism that

Not what they would? what praise could they receive?
What pleasure I from such obedience paid,
When Will and Reason (Reason also is choice)
Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil’d,
Made passive both, had serv’d necessity,
Not mee.
Areopagitica at 746.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 742.
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toleration would produce is not a bad thing; “those
neighboring differences, or rather indifferences . . .
whether in some point of doctrine or of discipline . . .
though they be many, need not interrupt ‘the unity of
spirit,’ if we could but find among us the ‘bond of
peace.’”61
Christopher Hill observes that Milton’s theology rests
on a radical Arminianism, in which salvation is available
to all men who believe, and is in no way dependent on the
formal ceremonies of Catholicism or of the Anglican
Church.62

In sacraments as Milton understands them, “it is

the attitude of the recipient that matters, not the
ceremony.”63

This radical individualism was connected with

a range of heretical religious views, many of them

61

Id. at 747-48. See also Paradise Lost, Book III, lines 183ff., in
Collected Poems and Major Prose at 262-63, where the “sincere intent”
of prayer is a lot more important than its content:
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace,
Elect above the rest; so is my will:
The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warn'd
Thir sinful state, and to appease betimes
Th’ incensed Deity while offer'd grace
Invites; for I will clear thir senses dark,
What may suffice, and soft’n stony hearts
To pray, repent, and bring obedience due.
To Prayer, repentance, and obedience due,
Though but endeavor'd with sincere intent,
Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut.
And I will place within them as a guide,
My Umpire Conscience, whom if they will hear,
Light after light well us'd they shall attain,
And to the end persisting, safe arrive.
62
Christopher Hill, Milton and the English Revolution 268-78 (1977).
63
Id. at 306.
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idiosyncratic to Milton.64

Prominent among these was the

priesthood of all believers: anyone with a gift for making
the Word of God known should be free to disseminate it.65
Milton’s defense of free speech depended crucially on his
religious views.66

Given Milton’s individualism, there was

little of value left for a state-sponsored church to do.
Thus Milton opposed any state funding for the support
of ministers.

The desire for state support, Milton argued,

reflected “covetousness and unjust claim to other men’s
goods; a contention foul and odious in any man, but most of
all in ministers of the gospel.”67

State-mandated tithes

for the established clergy “give men just cause to suspect
that they came neither called nor sent from above to preach
the word, but from below, by the instinct of their own
hunger, to feed upon the church.”68

The clergy’s claim to a

share of each person’s earnings, Milton observed, had led
to “their seizing of pots and pans from the poor, who have
as good right to tithes as they; from some, the very beds,”
64

See generally id. at 233-337. His religious views rested on a
reading of Biblical authority which was equally idiosyncratic. See
Regina M. Schwartz, Milton on the Bible, in A Companion to Milton
(Thomas N. Corns ed., 2001).
65
See William Haller, Liberty and Reformation in the Puritan Revolution
56-64 (1955).
66
See Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First
Amendment, Yale Law School Occasional Papers (1995), available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/ylsop/papers/6 (visited June 18, 2008).
67
John Milton, Considerations Touching the Likeliest Means to Remove
Hirelings Out of the Church (1659), in Collected Poems and Major Prose
at 857.
68
Id. at 870.
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from which “it may be feared that many will as much abhor
the gospel, if such violence as this be suffered in her
ministers, and in that which they also pretend to be the
offering of the Lord.”69

Such support was fundamentally

unChristian, because
the Christian church is universal; not tied to nation,
diocese, or parish, but consisting of many particular
churches complete in themselves, gathered not by
compulsion or the accident of dwelling nigh together,
but by free consent, choosing both their particular
church and their church officers.

Whereas if tithes

be set up, all these Christian privileges will be
disturbed and soon lost, and with them Christian
liberty.70
State support likewise elevates the civil power over
God, subjecting the church to the “political drifts or
conceived opinions”71 of the civil ruler, and thus “upon her
whose only head is in heaven, yea, upon him who is her only
head, sets another in effect, and, which is most monstrous,

69

Id. at 866.
Id. at 865.
71
Id. at 872. Cf. id. at 878: “For magistrates . . . will pay none
but such whom by their committees of examination they find conformable
to their interests and opinions: and hirelings will soon frame
themselves to that interest and those opinions which they see best
pleasing to their paymasters; and to seem right themselves, will force
others as to the truth.”
70
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a human on a heavenly, a carnal on a spiritual, a political
head on an ecclesiastical body.”72
Some authorities have suggested that state support of
religious should not be deemed to violate the establishment
clause unless someone is coerced to support a religion with
which they disagree.73

Certain versions of the corruption

argument, we shall see, condemn only coercive
establishments, while others reach any state support for
religion.

Milton falls into the latter category.

He never

seems to have considered the possibility of a noncoercive
establishment, but the argument just quoted reaches such an
establishment as well.

Any state influence over religion

of any kind is a usurpation.

ii.

Roger Williams

In the Americas, the germinal formulation of the
corruption argument is that of Milton’s friend Roger
Williams, who invented the modern, religiously tolerant
state when he founded Rhode Island in 1635.

Williams also

72

Id. at 872.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-94 (2005)(Thomas, J.,
concurring); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of
Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933 (1986). For critique of
claims that this was the original meaning of the establishment clause,
see Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion: Another False
Theory About the Establishment Clause, 26 Val. L. Rev. 37 (1991).
73
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was one of the first to use the metaphor of the wall of
separation between church and state, and his overriding
concern was that, absent such a wall, the church would be
corrupted by the world.

Williams’s religious views are

deeply alien to modern sensibilities.
individualist.

He was no secular

Timothy Hall observes that Williams was “a

religious fanatic” who “did not champion a proto-ecumenism
and was not the sort of person likely to attend an
interfaith community worship service.”74

Williams’s

weirdness shows how broad the range of views is that can
join in an overlapping consensus.75

Common ground can be

found even between modern liberals and the likes of
Williams.
Williams’s political views grew out of his religious
ideas.76

Williams was a part of the Separatist movement,

which held that only those who had personally received
God’s grace could partake in the sacrament of communion.
The Puritans who believed this eventually concluded that
74

Timothy L. Hall, Separating Church and State: Roger Williams and
Religious Liberty 18, 6 (1998).
75
Hall notes this and uses the term on pp. 8-10, 147, and 165. The
parallel between Williams and Rawls is developed at much greater length
in Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 34-71. See also the exposition of
Williams’s political philosophy in Edmund S. Morgan, Roger Williams:
The Church and the State 115-26 (1967).
76
Nussbaum claims that Williams “nowhere alludes to these beliefs in
arguing for liberty of conscience – nor should he, since it is his
considered position that political principles should not be based on
sectarian religious views of any sort.” Nussbaum, supra note 38, at
43. This is true of some of Williams’s arguments. It is not, however,
true of his argument that establishment corrupts religion.
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they had to leave the Church of England, which ministered
to saints and sinners alike, and form new, separate
churches.77

Williams accepted this argument, and eventually

radicalized it by holding that the Separatist churches of
New England were unregenerate as long as they did not
publicly repent for ever having had anything to do with the
Anglican church.

Even regenerate persons, such as Martin

Luther or the martyrs burned by Queen Mary, were
unqualified for church membership until they repented their
past associations with corrupted churches, whether Catholic
or Anglican.78

Similar logic led him to hold that a man

should not pray with his wife unless both were regenerate.
The Puritans departed from English establishment by
separating religious from political authority.

No

clergyman held any public office in early Massachusetts.79
However, the state was responsible for the spiritual
welfare of its citizens, and heresy was a punishable
offense; Williams himself was exiled for his heretical
views.80

Ministers were supported by taxes, and voting and

public office were restricted to church members.81

77
78
79
80
81

Morgan, supra note 75, at 11-17.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 74-76.
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Williams condemned all this.

Religious activity,

Williams thought, was worthless unless it was sincere:
“what ever Worship, Ministry, Ministration, the best and
purest are practiced without faith and true perswasion that
they are the true institutions of God, they are sin . . .”82
Authenticity of belief was, on the contrary, the central
requirement for salvation.

If one held that some points of

doctrine were so fundamental that salvation is impossible
without believing them,
I should everlastingly condemn thousands, and ten
thousands, yea the whole generation of the righteous,
who since the falling away (from the first primitive
Christian state or worship) have and doe erre
fundamentally concerning the true matter,
constitution, gathering and governing of the Church:
and yet farre be it from a pious breast to imagine
that they are not saved, and that their soules are not
bound up in the bundle of eternall life.83
State coercion to participate in religious services
was sinful for everyone present:

it corrupted the service

82

Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, for cause of
Conscience, discussed, in A Conference betweene Truth and Peace, in 3
The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 12 (1963).
83
Id. at 64. On the other hand, Williams evidently presupposes in this
passage that he is only talking about Christians. He does not suggest
that people exposed to the Christian message who rejected it in favor
of a competing nonChristian view could be saved. Thanks to Kent
Greenawalt for pressing me on this point.

36

by introducing the presence of sinners, and it lulled the
sinners into a false sense of security, hiding from them
their awful condition.84

Moreover, no human being had the

power to start churches – that right was reserved to God –
and so the people could not delegate to the state an
authority to control religion that they did not themselves
possess.85

To subject religion to temporal power was thus

“to pull God and Christ, and Spirit out of Heaven, and
subject them unto naturall, sinfull, inconstant men, and so
consequently to Sathan himselfe, by whom all peoples
naturally are guided.”86
Williams’s defense of freedom of conscience was
crucially dependent on his ideas about the incompetence of
government in religious matters.
for its own sake.

He did not value freedom

For Williams, Perry Miller observes,

“freedom was something negative, which protects men from
worldly compulsions in a world where any compulsion, most
of all one to virtue, increases the quantity of sin.
Liberty was a way of not adding to the stock of human
depravity; were men not sinful, there would be no need of
freedom.”87

In nonreligious matters of morality that (he

84

Morgan, supra note 75, at 32, 139.
Id. at 89.
86
Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, supra note 82, at 250.
87
Perry Miller, Roger Williams: His Contribution to the American
Tradition 29 (1962).
85
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thought) affected the public safety, in which he included
quarreling, disobedience, prostitution, uncleanliness, and
lasciviousness, the state could legitimately coerce even
those who were motivated by religion.88

Williams did not

favor religious exemptions as such, though he did worry
that government’s claim to be pursuing legitimate public
interests might sometimes be a mask for religious
persecution.89

Conscience should be respected, not because

it was less likely to err in religious matters, but rather
because the conscientious search for religious truth was
the only possible path to salvation.

Although only a few

people could be saved, conscience alone could bring even
this small number to God.
A consequence of disestablishment that troubled most
of Williams’s contemporaries was that voluntary
contributions might not be enough to support churches.
This did not bother Williams, because he thought that only
false churches existed in the world, and that therefore the
world would be no worse if they all disappeared.90

It

followed from Williams’s radical individualism that any
religious institution at all was a corruption of

88

Morgan, supra note 75, at 126-135; but see Nussbaum, supra note 38,
at 49-51.
89
Hall, supra note 74, at 103-11, 120-1.
90
William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and
State in America, 73 Am. Hist. Rev. 1392, 1408 (1968).
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Christianity.

The worthlessness of any state-sponsored

church was a corollary.
If you don’t accept the theological premises of
Separatism, then Williams’s arguments about corruption
won’t move you at all.

But it was by way of his Separatism

that he arrived at a view of the proper role of government
that bracketed religious controversy from public life.
Because Williams’s theological views are so
pessimistic and intolerant, he is a wonderful
counterexample to Rousseau’s dictum that "it is impossible
to live at peace with those whom one believes to be
damned."91

It’s hard to find another American thinker who

was as convinced as Williams that his neighbors were headed
for the inferno.92

91

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, book 4, ch. 8.
Mark DeWolfe Howe’s The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and
Government in American Constitutional History (1965) appropriates
Williams in a strange way. Howe, throughout the book, draws a contrast
much like that of Gedicks, contrasting the Jeffersonian, secularist
view of separation, which he disfavors, with that of Williams, who
feared “the worldly corruptions which might consume the churches if
sturdy fences against the wilderness were not maintained.” Id. at 6.
He takes as evidence that the Williams view better represents our
traditions what he calls the “de facto establishment,” which embraces
“a host of favoring tributes to faith” such as Sunday closing laws, the
use of God on the currency, legislative prayers, Thanksgiving
proclamations, and so forth. Id. at 11. He uses the term because
“this social reality, in its technical independence from law, bears
legally some analogy to that ugly actuality known as de facto
segregation.” Id.
This gives rise to several puzzles. What Howe describes isn’t de
facto at all, but de jure. De facto segregation is segregation in
which the state does not officially give recognition to race at all, or
even silently but intentionally take race into account. What Howe
calls de facto establishment is a set of practices in which the state
behaves in overtly religious ways, and proclaims religious truth.

92
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iii.

John Locke

The idea that state authority over religion can
corrupt religion is likewise emphasized in John Locke’s
Letter Concerning Toleration.

The central target of the

Letter is the forcible repression of those who dissented
from the doctrines of the Anglican church.

The punishment

“Ceremonial deism” would be a better term for these practices. (In
fact, the Court has never used “de facto establishment,” but there have
been a few references to “ceremonial deism” in the opinions.) When
Justice Brennan introduced that term, he wrote:
such practices as the designation of “In God We Trust” as our
national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge
of Allegiance can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt
phrase, as a form of “ceremonial deism,” protected from
Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost
through rote repetition any significant religious content.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Perhaps ceremonial deism can be justified. But Williams would be
a strange authority to invoke on its behalf. Williams’ suspicion of
state control over religion would appear logically to extend to any
degree of ceremonial support for religion. The draining of religious
meaning through rote repetition is just the kind of degradation of
religion that Williams was afraid of. That’s why Rhode Island didn’t
have an established church. If the state is incompetent to adjudicate
religious matters, then why should it be authorized to declare that
there is one God, and that the Hindus, Buddhists, and atheists are
mistaken about this question? This question never occurs to Howe. One
can imagine what Williams would have thought of the modern Christmas
display, paid for by tax dollars secured through the influence of the
local merchants’ association, reminding us that Christ suffered and
died on the cross so that we could enjoy great holiday shopping.
On the limits of Howe’s reading of Williams, see also Nussbaum,
supra note 38, at 41, 59; Garry Wills, Head and Heart: American
Christianities 97 (2007).
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 2083 (1996), points out that ceremonial deism
is inconsistent with the main thrust of contemporary establishment
clause doctrine. But his argument is not conclusive, because there are
always two ways of resolving an inconsistency. When he tries to defend
a rule of neutrality, the sole concern on which he relies is the
alienation of nonbelievers. He does not rely on the corruption
argument at all. This makes his argument weaker than it needs to be.
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of dissent in Restoration England was severe, with about
ten percent of the country’s population subject to
confiscation of goods, imprisonment, and deportation.
Locke dissented from all this.

The position he advocated

was shortly to be enacted in the Toleration Act of 1689,
which granted freedom of worship to Protestant Trinitarian
dissenters who took an oath of allegiance.93

(That Act also

ended the repressive Massachusetts regime that Williams had
opposed.)
Locke argued that “the Care of Souls is not committed to
the Civil Magistrate, any more than to other Men.”94

Part

of the reason was the limited responsibilities of the
state, which existed, according to his well-known social
contract theory, solely in order to protect life, liberty,
and property.

But another was that “no Man can, if he

would, conform his Faith to the Dictates of another.”95
Coerced worship, Locke argues, would be “Hipocrisie, and
Contempt of his Divine Majesty.”96

Coercion of worship is

absurd, because what it produces has no religious value.
“Although the Magistrates Opinion in Religion be sound, and
the way that he appoints be truly Evangelical, yet if I be
93
James H. Tully, Introduction, in John Locke, A Letter Concerning
Toleration 1-3 (1689; James H. Tully ed. 1983).
94
John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 26 (1689; James H. Tully
ed. 1983).
95
Id.
96
Id. at 27.
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not thoroughly perswaded thereof in my own mind, there will
be no safety for me in following it.

No way whatsoever

that I shall walk in, against the Dictates of my
Conscience, will ever bring me to the Mansions of the
Blessed.”97

Moreover, the religious divisions that existed

“for the most part” concerned “frivolous things .

. . that

(without any prejudice to Religion or the Salvation of
Souls, if not accompanied with Superstition or Hypocrisie)
might either be observed or omitted,” and that such matters
ought not to divide “Christian Brethren, who are all agreed
in the Substantial and truly Fundamental part of
Religion.”98
These arguments reach only coercion, and so do not speak
directly to gentler forms of state authority over religion.
Locke aspired to a social unity that crossed denominational
lines, but one that only included Christians.99

But Locke

also thought that the state was generally incompetent to
adjudicate religious questions:

“The one only narrow way

which leads to Heaven is not better known to the Magistrate
than to private Persons, and therefore I cannot safely take
him for my Guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the

97
98
99

Id. at 38.
Id. at 36.
Wills, supra note 92, at 177-83.
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way as my self, and who certainly is less concerned for my
Salvation than I my self am.”100
Locke’s argument is, of course, loaded with religious
premises:

that conscience is valuable because it is a way

of discovering God’s will; that it is sinful to act against
conscience; that the rights of conscience are inalienable,
and that no one can legitimately grant to another the right
to make one’s religious decisions.101

iv.

Samuel Pufendorf

The same premises animate the German philosopher Samuel
Pufendorf’s Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in
Reference to Civil Society, written in 1687, two years
before Locke’s Letter, in reaction to the revocation of the
Edict of Nantes by King Louis XIV.
Protestantism in France.

The revocation outlawed

Pufendorf is not a direct source

for American constitutional thought, but he was widely read
and influential.

When the first English translation of

this work was published in 1698, Pufendorf “was already
renowned in England and elsewhere in Europe” for his
100

Locke, supra note 94, at 37.
This is emphasized in Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality
(2002), especially at 208-211; Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure:
The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom 64-67
(1995), and Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds
Between Church and State, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 2255, 2258-69 (1997).
101
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writings on natural law, which “were to play a major role
in the shaping of German, Scottish, and French moral
philosophy up to the American and French revolutions.”102
Pufendorf began with the premise that “every body is
obliged to worship God in his own Person, religious duty
being not to be performed by a Deputy, but by himself, in
Person, who expects to reap the Benefit of religious
Worship, promised by God Almighty.”103

The state could have

nothing to do with this: truth could only be imparted by
convincing arguments, and revelation “must be acquired by
the assistance of Divine Grace, which is contrary to all
Violence.”104

God left people free to choose whether to be

saved or not:

“It was not God Almighty’s pleasure to pull

People head-long into Heaven, or to make use of the new
French way of Converting them by Dragoons; But, he has laid
open to us the way of our Salvation, in such a matter, as
not to have quite debarr’d us from our own choise; so, that
if we will be refractory, we may prove the cause of our own

102

Simone Zurburchen, Introduction, in Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Nature
and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society x-xi (1687;
Simone Zurburchen ed. 2002). However, “[e]xcept for the treatises on
natural law, little is known about the translation and reception of
Pufendorf’s works in Great Britain.” Id. at xvii. The American
colonists during the revolutionary period were quite familiar with his
work. See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution 23, 27, 29, 43, 150 (1967).
103
Pufendorf, Of the Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference
to Civil Society, at 13.
104
Id. at 15.

44

Destruction.”105

If orthodoxy is forcibly imposed, “by such

Methods, perhaps the Commonwealth may be stock’d with
Hypocrites, and dissembling Hereticks, but few will be
brought over to the Orthodox Christian Faith.”106

The

existence of open dissent may even “contribute to the
encrease of the Zeal and Learning of the established
Clergy,” as evidenced by the fact that “in those places and
times, where and when no Religious Differences were in
agitation, the Clergy soon degenerated into Idleness and
Barbarity.”107

Pufendorf’s book is replete with Biblical

quotations and citations.
Note how the character and scope of the threatened
corruption depends on the nature of the religion that needs
to be protected from corruption.

Unlike Roger Williams,

Pufendorf does not deny that churches are legitimate
institutions.

Unlike Milton or Locke, he does not deny the

competence of the state to determine religious matters.
For Pufendorf, corruption consists in the forcing of
individual consciences and the suppression of views
regarded by the sovereign as heretical.

v.
105
106
107

Elisha Williams

Id. at 33.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 109.
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The religious character of the corruption argument is
perhaps clearest in Congregationalist minister Elisha
Williams’s The Essential Rights and Liberties of
Protestants.

Williams’s pamphlet denounced a 1742

Connecticut law prohibiting ministers from preaching
outside their own parishes.
That the sacred scriptures are the alone rule of faith
and practice to a Christian, all Protestants are agreed
in; and must therefore inviolably maintain, that every
Christian has a right of judging for himself what he is
to believe and practice in religion according to that
rule . . . . Every one is under an indispensable
obligation to search the scripture for himself (which
contains the whole of it) and to make the best use of it
he can for his own information in the will of GOD, the
nature and duties of Christianity. And as every
Christian is so bound; so he has an unalienable right to
judge of the sense and meaning of it, and to follow his
judgment wherever it leads him; even an equal right with
any rulers be they civil or ecclesiastical. . . . That
faith and practice which depends on the judgment and
choice of any other person, and not on the person’s own
understanding judgment and choice, may pass for religion
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in the synagogue of Satan, whose tenet is that ignorance
is the mother of devotion; but with no understanding
Protestant will it pass for any religion at all.108
The idea that beliefs founded on the authority of other
people are worthless, so prominent in Milton, appears again
in Williams.
Now inasmuch as the scriptures are the only rule of
faith and practice to a Christian; hence every one has
an unalienable right to read, enquire into, and
impartially judge of the sense and meaning of it for
himself.

For if he is to be governed and determined

therein by the opinions and determinations of any
others, the scriptures cease to be a rule for him, and
those opinions and determinations of others are
substituted in the room thereof.109
The principle of establishment, Williams argued, “has
proved the grand engine of oppressing truth, Christianity,
and murdering the best men the world has had in it;
promoting and securing heresy, superstition and idolatry;
and ought to be abhorred by all Christians.”110

108

Elisha Williams, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants
(1744), in 1 Political Sermons of the Founding Era 1730-1805, at 55,
61, 62 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 2d ed. 1998). Williams also relies on a
Lockean social contract theory about the limited jurisdiction of the
state, id. at 56-61, 82-83, but he obviously does not stop there.
109
Id. at 63.
110
Id. at 77.
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Williams did not, however, object to noncoercive
endorsement of religion:

“if by the word establish be

meant only an approbation of certain articles of faith and
modes of worship, of government, or recommendation of them
to their subjects; I am not arguing against it.”111

Thomas

Curry observes a deep tension within Williams’s views on
this point.

Like other Congregational writers, he “assumed

that there existed a fundamental Christianity that every
reasonable Christian could advocate and, consequently, that
the State could promote without violating anyone’s
conscience.”

This “usually took the formed believed in by

themselves.”112

But they would become uncomfortable as soon

as the state began to promote positions with which they
disagreed.
Williams’s entire argument is premised on a set of
obligations that “all Protestants are agreed in.”

From

those obligations derive limitations on state power.

If

you don’t accept his Protestant premises, however, the
argument can have no weight at all.

B.

111
112

The founding generation

Id. at 73.
Curry, supra note 52, at 118.
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Proponents of the corruption argument at the time of the
founding came out of two very different religious factions.
By far the more numerous were the Baptists, led by Backus
and Leland.

But the principal spokespersons for the

argument were Enlightenment Deists such as Jefferson,
Paine, and Madison.

i.

Isaac Backus

The minister Isaac Backus wrote “the most complete and
well-rounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church
and state in the eighteenth century.”113

He and his much

younger colleague Leland, discussed below, were the leaders
of the Baptist movement for separation.

Like his admired

predecessors Roger Williams and Locke, Backus was centrally
concerned about corruption:

“bringing in an earthly power

between Christ and his people has been the grand source of
anti-Christian abominations.”114

Backus’s specific target

was the levying of religious taxes upon those who did not
subscribe to the established religion and the jailing of

113

William G. McLoughlin, Introduction, in Isaac Backus on Church,
State, and Calvinism 41-42 (William G. McLoughlin ed. 1968).
114
Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public For Religious Liberty (1773),
in id. at 334.
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unlicensed preachers.115

Both were persistent grievances of

the Baptists.
Like all the other writers we have examined, Backus
relied on the voluntarist premise:

“As God is the only

worthy object of all religious worship, and nothing can be
true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his revealed
will, of which each rational soul has an equal right to
judge for itself, every person has an unalienable right to
act in all religious affairs according to the full
persuasion of his own mind, where others are not injured
thereby."116

After some agonizing on the issue, he rejected

infant baptism.117
feel God’s call.

He thought preachers should be those who
External qualifications, such as a

college education or ordination, hindered God’s work.118

115

McLoughlin, Introduction, supra note 113, at 31. “Though never
imprisoned himself, he was several times in imminent danger of it.”
Id. at 31 n.11.
116
Isaac Backus, Isaac Backus’ Draft for a Bill of Rights for the
Massachusetts Constitution, 1779, in id. at 487. Put another way, “in
religion each one has an equal right to judge for himself, for we must
all appear before the judgment seat of Christ.” An Appeal at 332.
William McLoughlin notes that the individualism here is very different
from that of a Deist such as George Mason, who wrote in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights that religion “can be directed only by reason and
conviction, not by force or violence.” “The pietist wanted religuios
freedom so that men may follow the Truth of Revelation; the deist
wanted it so men might seek the truth wherever reason may lead.”
Introduction, supra note 113, at 47-48. See also William G.
McLoughlin, Isaac Backus and the Separation of Church and State in
America, 73 Am. Hist. Rev. 1392, 1403-04 (1968)(drawing a similar
contrast with Jefferson).
117
McLoughlin, supra note 113, at 8-9.
118
Id. at 29.
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Christian establishment did not lead to pure religion.
Rather, “tyranny, simony, and robbery came to be introduced
and to be practiced so long, under the Christian name.”119
Ministers who sought state support were unchristian:

“can

any man in the light of truth maintain his character as a
minister of Christ if he is not contented with all that
Christ’s name and influence will procure for him but will
have recourse to the kings of the earth to force money from
the people to support him under the name of an ambassador
of the God of Heaven.”120
delegated:

Religious duties could not be

“In all civil governments some are appointed to

judge for others and have power to compel others to submit
to their judgment, but our Lord has most plainly forbidden
us either to assume or submit to any such thing in
religion.”121

The state was also an unreliable source of

religious guidance.

“[A]s all earthly states are

changeable, the same sword that Constantine drew against
heretics, Julian turned against the orthodox.”122
Backus was, however, a less strong separationist than
his ally Jefferson.

He did not oppose official

proclamation of fast days and days of prayer.

119
120
121
122

He supported

Backus, Policy as Well as Honesty (1779), in id. at 373.
An Appeal to the Public at 314.
Id.
Id. at 315.
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a law confining public officeholding to Christians.123

He

endorsed a petition requesting Congress to create a bureau
to license the publication of Bibles, lest there be
erroneous or heretical translations.124

He did not object

to laws requiring attendance at church.125

In one tract he

opposed paying Episcopalian chaplains for Congress, but,
McLoughlin observes, “that was because they were
Episcopalians.”126

His views on church and state,

McLoughlin concludes, were “far less logical and
consistent”127 than those of his better-known contemporaries
Madison, Jefferson, or even Leland.

Rather, his view

resembled that of the proponents of noncoercive
establishment, such as John Adams, who regarded the rights
of conscience as “indisputable, unalienable, indefeasible,
[and] divine,” yet who nonetheless favored state-supported
establishments.128

ii.

Thomas Jefferson

123

McLoughlin, supra note 113, at 50.
Id.; Curry, supra note 52, at 217.
125
Curry, supra note 52, at 170.
126
2 William G. McLoughlin, New England Dissent, 1630-1883: The
Baptists and the Separation of Church and State 931 (1971).
127
McLoughlin, supra note 113, at 50.
128
John Witte, Jr., “A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment of
Religion”: John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. Church &
State 213 (1999). This inconsistency weakened the Baptists’ position
politically. “Congregationalists found it difficult to believe that
Baptist preoccupation with ministerial maintenance was anything more
than a rationalization of self-interest on the part of people who
wanted to avoid spending money.” Curry, supra note 52, at 176.
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Thomas Jefferson, the quintessential rational
Enlightenment proponent of separation, also relied on
religious arguments about the corrupting effects of
establishment.

In his 1777 Bill for Establishing Religious

Freedom, he proposed to do away with all religious coercion
and all taxation to support churches:

“no man shall be

compelled to frequent or support any religious worship,
place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods,
nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious
opinions or belief.”129
Jefferson, too, relied on theological premises.

He

noted that “Almighty God hath created the mind free,” and
from this he inferred that “all attempts to influence it by
temporal punishments, or burthens, or by civil
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy
author of our religion, who being lord both of body and
mind, yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either,
as was in his Almighty power to do.”130

He also noted the

129

Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in
Thomas Jefferson: Writings 347 (Merrill D. Peterson ed. 1984).
Jefferson reported drafting the bill in 1777; it was enacted, with some
deletions, in 1786. Id. at 1554.
130
Id. at 346.
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state’s incompetence:

“the impious presumption of

legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical,
who, being themselves but fallible and uninspired men, have
assumed dominion over the faith of others, setting up their
own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true and
infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on
others, hath established and maintained false religions
over the greatest part of the world and through all
time.”131

He specifically invoked corruption:

establishment “tends also to corrupt the principles of that
very religion it is meant to encourage, by bribing, with a
monopoly of worldly honours and emoluments, those who will
externally profess and conform to it.”132
unnecessary.

And all this was

Echoing Milton, Jefferson wrote that “truth

is great and will prevail if left to herself.”133
He repeated these arguments a few years later in his
Notes on the State of Virginia.

He explained that

religious dissent in Virginia had been fostered by
establishment:

“the great care of the government to

support their own church, having begotten an equal degree
of indolence in its clergy, two-thirds of the people had
become dissenters at the commencement of the present
131

Id.
Id. at 347. That the prevention of corruption is the dominant theme
in Jefferson’s bill is argued in Wills, supra note 92, at 191-97.
133
Jefferson, supra note 129, at 347.
132

54

revolution.”134
right.

Establishment was a violation of natural

“[O]ur rulers can have authority over such natural

rights only as we have submitted to them.

The rights of

conscience we never submitted, we could not submit.
answerable for them to our God.”135

We are

The effect of religious

coercion has been “[t]o make one half the world fools, and
the other half hypocrites.”136

But Jefferson’s argument,

too, goes beyond coercion to imply a more general state
neutrality toward religion.
advantageous in religion.

“Difference of opinion is

The several sects perform the

office of a Censor morum over each other.”137
Thus, Jefferson famously advocated a “wall of separation
between church and State.”138

He eliminated the chairs of

Divinity at the College of William and Mary, and prevented
such chairs from being established at the University of
Virginia, which did not even have a chaplain while he was
its rector.139
Jefferson’s idea of corruption was quite distinct from
that of the earlier thinkers we have considered, because he
was a deist who regarded any religious mystery as a foolish
134

Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in id. at 283.
Id. at 285.
136
Id. at 286.
137
Id.
138
To Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge and Others, a Committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association, Jan. 1, 1802, in id. at 510.
139
Levy, supra note 52 at 70-75; Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in
Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, at 62-65 (1977).
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superstition.

He was an admirer of Joseph Priestley’s

History of the Corruptions of Christianity, which denounced
such core Christian doctrines as the resurrection and the
Trinity.140

While he was President, he prepared a new,

corrected version of the Bible, using scissors and razor to
excise from the New Testament any claim of the divinity of
Jesus.141

The corruption of Christianity consisted

precisely in its capture by institutions that sought state
largesse:
My opinion is that there would never have been an
infidel, if there had never been a priest.

The

artificial structure they have built on the purest of
all moral systems, for the purpose of deriving from it
pence and power, revolts those who think for themselves,
and who read in that system only what is really there.142
Jefferson’s view had the potential to overlap with that
of the religious proponents of disestablishment we have
considered earlier.

Because his theological views were so

140

He wrote to Adams that he had read the book “over and over again.”
Quoted in David L. Holmes, The Faiths of the Founding Fathers 82
(2006). He “recommended it for students at the University of Virginia
as the work most likely to wean them from sectarian narrowness.”
Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in
America 48 (1963).
141
See Jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the
History of Culture 189-93 (1985).
142
Letter to Mrs. M. Harrison Smith, Aug. 6, 1816, quoted in Mead, supra
note 140, at 46. This letter is written late in Jefferson’s life, and
as Noah Feldman notes, he became more radical about religious matters
as he grew older, but even in his early career he sometimes expressed
anticlerical views in private. Feldman, supra note 15, at 39.
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different, however, they implied a dramatically different
understanding of what counted as corruption.

iii.

Thomas Paine

Similar to Jefferson, but even starker in his
rejection of traditional religious dogmas, was Thomas
Paine.

Paine was the author of Common Sense, “the most

incendiary and popular pamphlet of the entire Revolutionary
era.”143

His deism places him well outside the mainstream

of contemporary American religion, though the ideals he
articulates were pervasive among the educated elite.144

He

trumpeted ideas that other framers, such as Washington and
Franklin, privately believed but thought it prudent to keep
to themselves.145
Paine believed in God, but rejected all of the
specific doctrines of Christianity, which he regarded as a
collection of unbelievable superstitions.

He thought that

“religious duties consist in doing justice, loving mercy,
and endeavouring to make our fellow-creatures happy.”146
This, he thought, was the true teaching of Jesus Christ,
143

Gordon S. Wood, The American Revolution: A History 55 (2002).
On the place of Deism in 18th century America, see Holmes, supra note
140, at 1-51 (2006).
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See Holmes, supra note 140, at 53-71.
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but institutionalized Christianity “has set up a religion
of pomp and of revenue, in pretended imitation of a person
whose life was humility and poverty.”147

Establishment

corrupted religion precisely insofar as state support
tended to perpetuate “wild and whimsical systems of faith
and of religion.148
The adulterous connection of church and state,
wherever it has taken place, whether Jewish, Christian
or Turkish, has so effectually prohibited by pains and
penalties every discussion upon established creeds,
and upon first principles of religion, that until the
system of government should be changed, those subjects
could not be brought fairly and openly before the
world; but that whenever this should be done, a
revolution in the system of religion would follow.
Human inventions and priestcraft would be detected;
and man would return to the pure, unmixed and
unadulterated belief of one God, and no more.149
Paine confirmed the worst fears of proponents of
establishment by holding that without state support, the
147

Id. at 417.
Id. at 442.
149
Id. at 401. Benjamin Franklin held a similar view of “the essentials
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central dogmas of Christianity would wither away.

Paine,

however, regarded this as cause for celebration.

iv.

John Leland

It was not necessary to be a deist in order to support
strong separation.

One of Jefferson’s most loyal allies

was the Baptist minister John Leland.150

Like Backus, he

was primarily concerned with systems of taxation and
licensing that burdened nonconforming religions.

Far more

consistent than Backus, he strongly opposed any involvement
of the state in religious matters.

He was an important

source of the pressure to promise an amendment banning
establishment in exchange for the ratification of the
Constitution.

There are even unconfirmable stories

indicating that, had Madison not promised Leland to work
for such an amendment, Leland would have derailed the
Constitution by blocking ratification in Virginia.151
Leland, like the other writers we have examined, took
religious voluntarism as a basic premise.

“Every man must
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See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 156-57.
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Proc. Am. Antiquarian Soc. 154, 183-96 (1952). The evidence that the
meeting did take place is marshaled in greater detail in Mark
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Rights (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262520.
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give an account of himself to God, and therefore every man
ought to be at liberty to serve God in that way that he can
best reconcile it to his conscience.

If government can

answer for individuals at the day of judgment, let men be
controled by it in religious matters; otherwise let men be
free.”152
guidance:

The state was an unreliable source of religious
“It is error, and error alone, that needs human

support; and whenever men fly to the law or sword to
protect their system of religion, and force it upon others,
it is evident that they have something in their system that
will not bear the light, and stand upon the basis of
truth.”153

Establishments foster contempt for religion;

they “metamorphose the church into a creature, and religion
into a principle of state; which has a natural tendency to
make men conclude that bible religion is nothing but a
trick of state.”154

Even if nonconformity is tolerated, but

certain beliefs favored, “the minds of men are biassed to
embrace that religion which is favored and pampered by law
(and thereby hypocrisy is nourished) while those who cannot
stretch their consciences to believe any thing and every
thing in the established creed are treated with contempt

152

John Leland, The Rights of Conscience Inalienable (1791), in 2
Political Sermons of the Founding Era 1730-1805, at 1085 (Ellis Sandoz
ed., 2d ed. 1998).
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and opprobrious names.”155

The state should not have any

power to provide for ministers, enact Sabbath laws, pay
military chaplains, or have any religious qualifications
for office.156

He opposed a proposal to end delivery of the

mail on Sundays.157
Leland was as suspicious of dead religious forms as
Milton.

He opposed Sunday schools, theological seminaries,

and missionary societies, because their “natural tendency”
was “to reduce the gospel to school divinity, and represent
the work of the Holy Unction in the heart, to be no more
than what men can perform for themselves and for others;
and also to fill the ministerial ranks with pharisaical
hypocrites.”158

Even communion was of doubtful value,

because after “more than thirty years experiment, I have
had no evidence that the bread and wine ever assisted my
faith to discern the Lord’s body.

I have never felt guilty

for not communing, but often for doing it.”159
A common strand in all of these arguments is religious
individualism – the view that religious truth was a matter
between the individual and God.

Thomas Sanders observes

that Leland brought the individualism of the Enlightenment
155
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into religion, by abandoning the Puritan conception of a
community governed, collectively, by God’s law.

“The form,

nature, and significance of the church receded behind a
preoccupation with the conversion of single souls, and the
church represented no more than a voluntary compact of
individuals.”160
of the founding.

This assumption was pervasive at the time
In the late eighteenth century, Mark Noll

observes, most Americans “shared both a mistrust of
intellectual authorities inherited from previous
generations and a belief that true knowledge arose from the
use of one’s own senses – whether the external senses for
information about nature and society or the moral sense for
ethical and aesthetic judgments.

Most Americans were thus

united in the conviction that people had to think for
themselves in order to know science, morality, economics,
politics, and especially theology.”161

A state-sponsored

orthodoxy was as counterproductive in theology as it would
be in any of these other fields.
for the individual.

Salvation was a matter

“My best judgment tells me that my

neighbor does wrong,” Leland wrote, “but guilt is not

160
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transferable.

Every one must give an account of

himself.”162
Yet despite his alliance with Jefferson, Leland was no
rationalist.

He preached “the great doctrines of universal

depravity, redemption by the blood of Christ, regeneration,
faith, repentance, and self-denial.”163
voice of God speaking to him.

He once heard the

One night, some devilish

ghost approached his bed, groaning so horribly that Leland
hid under the bedclothes and prayed to God for help.

He

said, “I know myself to be a feeble, sinful worm.”164

Yet

he was indifferent to most theological controversies.165
Feeling mattered to him more than doctrine.166

He made

Jeffersonian political philosophy appealing to his poor,
ignorant, and enthusiastic followers, and thus “succeeded
in linking the political philosophy of the American
enlightenment with the camp-meeting spirit.”167

v.

James Madison
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The radical Protestantism of Backus and Leland and the
deism of Jefferson and Paine were brilliantly synthesized
by Madison in the Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, the classic description of the
pathologies that the founding generation associated with
establishment.

Madison, of course, is the one who actually

led the movement for disestablishment, first leading the
fight in Virginia, then as principal author of the First
Amendment.
Madison’s argument reaches well beyond coercion, because
it was offered against a bill that attempted to provide
nonpreferential aid to religion.

The bill in question

would have allowed all Christian churches to receive tax
money, and would have permitted each taxpayer to designate
the church to receive his tax.

If the taxpayer refused to

designate a church, the funds would go to schools.168

Even

this nonpreferential aid, Madison thought, tended to
corrupt religion.
Madison was a rationalist Deist.

He deplored the fact

that “accidental differences in political, religious, and
other opinions” were the cause of factional disputes.
“However erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of
168

A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian
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64

dissention and faction may appear to the enlightened
Statesman, or the benevolent philosopher, the bulk of
mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will
continue to view them in a different light.”169

The

coalition he led, however, consisted predominantly of
Baptists and Presbyterians.

All supported freedom of

conscience, thought that religion was essentially
voluntary, and regarded man’s allegiance to God as prior to
state authority.

But the rationalists emphasized natural

rights and the use of reason in the pursuit of religious
truth, while the religious dissenters wanted to free man to
respond to God’s call and the scriptural teachings of
Christ.

Each side drew on the other’s rhetoric, but they

had fundamentally different goals.170

Madison’s task was to

bring them together into a political coalition that could
disestablish Anglicanism in Virginia.
The Memorial and Remonstrance begins with a
theological claim, offering an understanding of religious
duty which at this point will be familiar:

“It is the duty

of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such
only as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is

169

Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct, 24, 1787,
reprinted in 1 The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence Between
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, 1776-1826, at 501 (James Morton
Smith, ed. 1995).
170
See Buckley, supra note 139, at 179-80.

65

precedent, both in order of time and in degree of
obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.”

Madison

further argued that the idea “that the Civil Magistrate is
a competent Judge of Religious Truth” is “an arrogant
pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of
Rulers in all ages.”

The idea that religion should be

promoted because it conduces to good citizenship, an idea
that we often hear even today, Madison denounced as an
attempt to “employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy,”
which he thought “an unhallowed perversion of the means of
salvation.”171

Moreover,

experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical
establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation.
During almost fifteen centuries has the legal
establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have
been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and
indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in
the laity, in both, superstition, bigotry and
persecution.172

171

James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, in Marvin Meyers ed., The Mind of the Founder: Sources of
the Political Thought of James Madison 9 (rev. ed. 1981).)
172
Id. at 9-10. The importance of the corruption theme in the Memorial
is further elaborated in Wills, supra note 92, at 207-22.

66

Madison was reticent about his own religious beliefs,
which were probably some variant of Deism,173 but the
Memorial and Remonstrance is nonetheless the most useful
source of anti-establishment thinking.

It was a public

document, not a private statement of Madison’s views.

It

presented a synthesis of the anti-establisment views that
prevailed in his time, combining religious arguments
designed to appeal to Evangelical Christians and secular
arguments designed to appeal to Enlightenment Lockeans.174
It is unlikely that these groups agreed on anything more
than the propositions stated by Madison himself.

But they

did agree about them.175
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What Madison achieved in Virginia is a fine early
example of the kind of overlapping consensus contemplated
by Taylor.

A collection of very different comprehensive

views of the purpose of human life converges on a set of
political principles.

The Memorial states a set of

pathologies that are to be avoided, which can be regarded
as pathologies from a variety of different points of view.
Different members of his coalition had different ideas
about why these were pathologies.

They had fundamentally

different ideas of what a non-corrupted religion would look
like.

Madison was carefully noncommittal about which of

them was right.

The coalition did not last long.

It

shortly fragmented over support for the French
Revolution.176

But by that time, the Establishment Clause

had been adopted, and it remains in the Constitution.
Later, as President, Madison vetoed a Congressional
act incorporating an Episcopal congregation in the District
of Columbia, and at first refused to issue proclamations of
days of thanksgiving and prayer.

He later did issue such

proclamations, but still later, said that this was a

For several reasons, the debates in Virginia were most important.
First, the arguments were developed most fully in Virginia. Second,
Madison led the winning coalition, and he played a dominant role in
the adoption of the establishment clause three years later. Third,
the debates in Virginia may have been the best known.
Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim
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176
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mistake.

Finally, in an unpublished memorandum written

late in his life and found after his death, he opposed the
creation of Congressional and military chaplains.177

C.

Other formulations

We have concluded our review of the use of the
corruption argument up to the time of the framing of the
First Amendment.

There are, however, three other writers

who have had such a powerful influence on modern thinking
about the corrupting effect of establishments that they
should be considered here.

Two of them, Adam Smith and

Alexis de Tocqueville, are major political theorists.

The

third, Justice Hugo Black, is the principal architect of
modern Establishment Clause doctrine.

i.

Adam Smith

Smith did not participate in the framing.

He never

traveled to the United States, spending most of his life in
his native Scotland.

But he was widely read in America.

The Wealth of Nations was found in 28 percent of American
177
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libraries in the period from 1777-1790, exceeding the
holdings of Locke’s Treatises and any book by Rousseau
except Emile.

Smith had a substantial impact on the

thinking of the framers of the Constitution, and
particularly on Madison’s views about religious liberty.178
Smith focused, not on coercion, but on state financial
support for an established church.

He thought that if

clergy were given dependable incomes from the state,
“[t]heir exertion, their zeal and industry,”179 were likely
to be much diminished.
The clergy of an established and well-endowed religion
frequently become men of learning and elegance, who
possess all the virtues of gentlemen; but they are apt
gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad,
which gave them authority and influence with the
inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been
the original causes of the success and establishment
of their religion.180
Smith was responding to his friend David Hume’s
defense of established churches.

In a passage that Smith

quoted at length, Hume argued that the “interested
178
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diligence” of the clergy, spurred by the need for voluntary
contributions of support, “is what every wise legislator
will study to prevent, because, in every religion except
the true, it is highly pernicious, and it has even a
natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a
strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion.”

Such

superstitious delusions, together with “the most violent
abhorrence of all other sects,” is what is most likely to
draw customers.

The way to avoid this pernicious behavior

by the clergy is “to bribe their indolence, by assigning
stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it
superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to
prevent their flock from straying in quest of new
pastures.”181
Smith agreed that, absent establishment, each pastor
would be pressed try to increase the number of his
disciples.

“But as every other teacher would have felt

himself under the same necessity, the success of no one
teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great.”182
The consequence would be “a great multitude of religious
sects.”183

This pressure would in turn produce a better

religion than an establishment could:

181
182
183
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The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves
almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of
almost every other sect, and the concessions which
they would mutually find it both convenient and
agreeable to make to one another, might in time reduce
the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure
and rational religion, free from every mixture of
absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism . . . .184
Smith also thought that small religious sects were much
more likely than large churches to police the conduct of
their members and keep them away from the dangers of
profligacy and vice that were particularly ubiquitous in
large cities.185
Samuel Fleischacker thinks it unlikely that Madison
had read The Wealth of Nations at the time he wrote the
Memorial and Remonstrance, but argues that the arguments
against establishment just cited did have an influence on
Madison’s famous argument in Federalist 10 that political
factions could more easily be controlled in a large
republic.

Madison there responds to the widespread concern

that in democracies, majorities will be prone to oppress
minorities.

184
185

Federalist 10 claims that this danger will be

Id. at 793.
Id. at 795-76.
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averted by the size of the new American republic that the
Constitution would create.

“Extend the sphere and you take

in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for
all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act
in unison with each other.”186

Madison makes the point

specifically with respect to religious factions:

“a

religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a
part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed
over the entire face of it must secure the national
councils against any danger from that source.”187
Fleischacker observes the similarity between Madison’s
analysis of factions and Smith’s analysis of sects:

mutual

conflict makes both weaker and less capable of achieving
pernicious ends that they regard as their good.

Both

thought that deep features of human nature produce this
result:

“people generally want to be addressed in

truthful, decent terms, rather than with the accent of
passion and prejudice, strong emotions driving fanaticism
tend to dominate only for short periods of time and are

186
187
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discouraged in normal social intercourse, and people have
economic and other interests connecting them with a great
range of others in society.”188

Because social forces tended

to temper the problem, there was less need for enlightened
statesmen to do the job.

“Both Madison and Smith saw the

liberty that gave rein to such interests as compatible with
a republic that would be concerned, for the most part, with
fostering virtue.”189

For both, uncorrupted religion could

be known by its fruits:

peaceable, virtuous behavior.

It’s worth noting for a moment here a now-familiar
argument that neither of them was making, but that is
easily confused with theirs.

That is the idea that

religion is improved by market-like competition, in which
the better religions succeed and the worse ones go out of
business.

Friedrich Hayek, in some ways a disciple of

Smith, makes this claim.

Hayek thought that the

persistence of customs conducive to social cooperation was
closely tied to the support those customs received from
religion.
effect.

Of course, not all religions had this beneficent

“Among the founders of religions over the last two

thousand years, many opposed property and the family.

But

the only religions that have survived are those which

188
189
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support property and the family.”190

The process by which

the pertinent selection occurred may have been invisible to
those who benefited from it.

“Customs whose beneficial

effects were unperceivable by those practicing them were
likely to be preserved long enough to increase their
selective advantage only when supported by some other
strong beliefs; and some powerful supernatural or magic
faiths were readily available to perform this role.”191

What

matters is that the customs that survived were the ones
that “influence[ed] men to do what was required to maintain
the structure enabling them to nourish their enlarging
numbers.”192
It is clear what Hayek’s notion of uncorrupted
religion is:

any set of beliefs (whether they are true or

false does not matter) that enables people to engage,
“peacefully though competitively, in pursuing thousands of
different ends of their own choosing in collaboration with
thousands of persons whom they will never know.”193

Hayek
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himself was an atheist who regarded the notion of God as
unintelligible;194 effects were all he cared about.
The dynamic of competition contemplated by Hayek is
quite unlike that of Madison or Smith, primarily because of
Hayek’s evident reliance on the theories of Max Weber and
Charles Darwin.195

Weber argued that the early growth of

capitalism in Europe was facilitated by militant Calvinism,
which promoted rationality, calculating frugality, and the
highly systematized pursuit of profit.

This, he thought,

was why the most prosperous parts of Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were Protestant ones:
Holland, England, Brandenburg-Prussia, and the Huguenot
communities of France.196

Darwin thought that some traits

became more common in successive generations of organisms
because those traits were more conducive to their carriers’
survival in a given environment.197

Hayek’s model combines a

Darwinian model of competition with a Weberian model of the
effect of some religious ideas on economic behavior.
Religions that promote economic cooperation, as early
Protestantism did, are most likely to survive and prosper.

194
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Madison and Smith had a very different idea of the
effects of competition.

They both thought that the

factions themselves would intentionally modify their
behavior in the face of competition.
that species intentionally evolved.

Darwin did not think
Weber did not think

that the Calvinists were deliberately aiming at the
creation of a capitalist economy.

For Hayek, cooperation-

inducing rules need not be adopted for that purpose:
“Neither the groups who first practised these rules, nor
those who imitated them, need ever have known why their
conduct was more successful than that of others, or helped
the group persist.”198
Hayek did not care about religion as such at all.
liked it because he thought it was instrumentally good.

He
He

thus parts company with both Madison and Smith.

ii.

Alexis de Tocqueville

A variant of the corruption argument holds that
establishment can only generate the kind of religion that
people are likely to hold in low regard.

This argument was

pressed during the election of 1800 by followers of
Jefferson, who wanted to discourage Federalist clergy from
198
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opposing Jefferson for his deism.199

(As we just saw, it was

also anticipated by Hume, who however thought that the
decline of religious enthusiasm was a good thing and so
supported establishment.)
Here the baseline against which corruption is measured
is not the Protestant one of personal communion with God,
but simply sincere religiosity, whatever its content.
argument thus is less pervasively Protestant.

The

But it

continues to presume that religion is a good thing, and
that this good thing can be corrupted by state sponsorship.
The classic proponent of this argument is Alexis de
Tocqueville.
Tocqueville, writing at about the time that the last
establishment in America was being abandoned, thought that
in the new egalitarian regime of the United States, the old
feudal morality had disappeared, and a pressing question
was what kinds of morality would take its place.

The

answer was that people would be motivated by “self-interest
properly understood.”200

They could be made to understand

that it was in their self-interest to do good and serve
their fellow creatures.

The rational pursuit of self-

interest would not produce heroes, but it would shape “a

199
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lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, careful, and selfcontrolled citizens.”201
Religion played a crucial role in bringing about this
understanding.

“The main business of religions is to

purify, control, and restrain that excessive and exclusive
taste for well-being which men acquire in times of equality
. . . .”202

Tocqueville was silent on the theological

issues, but he thought religious belief important to the
well-being of democracy.

“How could society escape

destruction if, when political ties are relaxed, moral ties
are not tightened? And what can be done with a people
master of itself if it is not subject to God?”203
All religions, Tocqueville thought, had salutary
social consequences:
Every religion places the object of man’s desires
outside and beyond worldly goods and naturally lifts
the soul into regions far above the realm of the
senses.

Every religion also imposes on each man some

obligations toward mankind, to be performed in common
with the rest of mankind, and so draws him away, from

201
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time to time, from thinking about himself.

That is

true even of the most false and dangerous religions.204
The American experience had taught that the best way
to promote religion was to keep the state away from it.
Man is naturally religious.

Because “the incomplete joys

of this world will never satisfy his heart,”205 he is
naturally driven, by “an invincible inclination,”206 toward
contemplation of another world.
The “intellectual aberration”207 of unbelief had arisen
in Europe, Tocqueville thought, only because of
establishment.

Because religion had become identified with

a conservative politics, it aroused the opposition of
anyone who opposed the conservative party.

It thereby

forfeited its natural strength.
As long as religion relies only upon the sentiments
which are the consolation of every affliction, it can
draw the heart of mankind to itself. When it is
mingled with the bitter passions of this world, it is
sometimes constrained to defend allies who are such
from interest rather than from love; and it has to
repulse as adversaries men who still love religion,
although they are fighting against religion's allies.
204
205
206
207
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Hence religion cannot share the material strength of
the rulers without being burdened with some of the
animosity roused against them.208
This, Tocqueville thought, was why religious faith had
withered in Europe.

“Unbelievers in Europe attack

Christians more as political than as religious enemies;
they hate the faith as the opinion of a party much more
than as a mistaken belief, and they reject the clergy less
because they are the representatives of God than because
they are the friends of authority.”209

In America, on the

other hand, religion was powerful precisely because it was
not associated with any party.

All the clergy with whom

Tocqueville spoke during his visit to America agreed that
“the main reason for the quite sway of religion over their
country was the complete separation of church and state.”210
Tocqueville agrees with Smith and Hume that sincere
and enthusiastic religion is likely to be promoted by
disestablishment, and he insists, even more than Smith,
that religious enthusiasm is likely to conduce to virtue.
208
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He is too sanguine, however, in his suggestion that “even .
. . the most false and dangerous religions” can produce
these valuable results.

Marvin Zetterbaum observes that

Tocqueville’s solution to the problem of how to make selfcentered people virtuous “lies in a simple extension of the
principle of self-interest to include the rewards of a
future life.”211

But it matters what those rewards are

supposed to be rewards for.

It is true that one must look

beyond narrow self-interest in order to be willing to fly
an airplane into a building.212

Steven Smith has observed

that “we cannot sensibly talk about the effects of
‘religion’ on character because different forms of religion
attempt to inculcate very different character traits.”213
Whether religion is conducive to virtue “also depends on
the kind of virtues that a particular society chooses to
foster.”214

Tocqueville’s vagueness on this point

anticipates the famous remark of Dwight Eisenhower that
“our form of government has no sense unless it is founded
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in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it
is.”215

iii.

Hugo Black

The architect of modern Establishment Clause law is
Justice Hugo Black, who wrote the most important early
opinions interpreting the Clause.216

Decisions authored by

him declared that the Establishment Clause was applicable
to the states,217 that a “released time” program in which
religious instruction was offered in the public schools was
unconstitutional,218 that state officeholders could not be
required to profess a belief in God,219 and that stateauthored school prayers violated the Constitution.220
The last of these contained the most explicit
invocation of the corruption rationale in any Supreme Court
opinion, quoted more fully above,221 which concluded with
the declaration that “religion is too personal, too sacred,

215
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Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
218
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
219
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
220
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
221
See supra text accompanying note 46.
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too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil
magistrate.”222

According to one account, when Black

delivered the judgment of the Court, his “‘voice trembled
with emotion as he paused over ‘too personal, too sacred,
too holy’ . . . And he added extemporaneously, ‘The prayer
of each man from his soul must be his and his alone.’”223
Three days after the decision was announced, in a letter
explaining his decision to a niece, Black dismissed the
idea that “prayer must be recited parrot-like in public
places in order to be effective,” citing the passage of the
Sermon on the Mount that emphasizes the value of praying
privately.224
Similarly strong language appears in his dissent in
Zorach v. Clauson.225

“Under our system of religious

freedom, people have gone to their religious sanctuaries

222

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962), quoting Madison,
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
223
Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography 523 (1994).
224
Id. at 523-24; Dane, supra note 32, at 569. He reportedly cited the
same passage in other correspondence concerning Engel. See Mr. Justice
and Mrs. Black: The Memoirs of Hugo L. Black and Elizabeth Black 95
(1986). His son recalls him saying, in response to the protest against
Engel: “Most of these people who are complaining, son, are pure
hypocrites who never pray anywhere but in public for the credit of it.
Prayer ought to be a private thing, just like religion for a truly
religious person.” Hugo Black, Jr., My Father: A Remembrance 176
(1975).
Similar impatience with the rote recitation of words not felt is
evident in a concurring opinion he coauthored with Justice Douglas in
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943)(Black,
J., and Douglas, J., concurring): “Words uttered under coercion are
proof of loyalty to nothing but self-interest. Love of country must
spring from willing hearts and free minds . . . .”
225
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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not because they feared the law but because they loved
their God. The choice of all has been as free as the choice
of those who answered the call to worship moved only by the
music of the old Sunday morning church bells. The spiritual
mind of man has thus been free to believe, disbelieve, or
doubt, without repression, great or small, by the heavy
hand of government.”226

The language of the holy and the

sacred appear once again:

“State help to religion injects

political and party prejudices into a holy field. . . .
Government should not be allowed, under cover of the soft
euphemism of ‘co-operation,’ to steal into the sacred area
of religious choice.”227
Similar themes can be found in almost all of his
Establishment Clause opinions.228

He quoted with approval

the religious anti-establishment arguments of Roger
Williams, Jefferson and Madison.229

On this basis he laid

down the most fundamental Establishment Clause
restrictions, most of which remain unquestioned to this
day:
226

Id. at 319-20.
Id. at 320.
228
The exception is his concurrence in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968), in which he argued that a statute barring the teaching of
evolution in the public schools should be invalidated on grounds of
vagueness rather than as an Establishment Clause violation. He there
suggested that, because both Darwin and the Bible were excluded from
the curriculum, it was arguable that the exclusion “leave[s] the State
in a neutral position toward these supposedly competing religious and
anti-religious doctrines.” Id. at 113 (Black, J., concurring).
229
Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13; Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-34.
227
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The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In
the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
“a wall of separation between Church and State.”230

230

Id. at 15-16. He fought with Justice Felix Frankfurter over whether
this opinion ought to be cited in subsequent Supreme Court opinions.
See James F. Simon, The Antagonists: Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter and
Civil Liberties in Modern America 180-83 (1989); Samuel A. Alito, Note,
The “Released Time” Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Decisionmaking
by the Supreme Court, 83 Yale. L. J. 1202, 1210-1222 (1974). Black
repeated this entire passage in McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210-211, Torcaso,
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Repudiating the claim that his decisions manifested
hostility to religion, he wrote that “the First Amendment
rests upon the premise that both religion and government
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left
free from the other within its respective sphere.”231

He

rejected the requirement that a Notary Public profess a
belief in God, because “The power and authority of the
State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular
sort of believers-those who are willing to say they believe
in ‘the existence of God.’”
opinion:

232

He then quoted an earlier

“we have staked the very existence of our country

on the faith that complete separation between the state and
religion is best for the state and best for religion.”233
He cited the old theme that establishment breeds hypocrisy,
arguing that the rule followed “the historically and
constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious
beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons
who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a
belief in some particular kind of religious concept.”234
The school prayer decision declared that “the

367 U.S. at 492-93, and his dissent in Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 250-51 (1968).
231
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
232
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
233
Id. at 494, quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), which in turn was quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 59
(Rutledge, J., dissenting).
234
Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 494.
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constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this
country it is no part of the business of government to
compose official prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried
on by government.”235

Disestablishment meant that “the

people's religions must not be subjected to the pressures
of government for change each time a new political
administration is elected to office.”236

The Establishment

Clause, Black claimed, “was written to quiet well-justified
fears which nearly all of them felt arising out of an
awareness that governments of the past had shackled men's
tongues to make them speak only the religious thoughts that
government wanted them to speak and to pray only to the God
that government wanted them to pray to.”237
Recent scholarship has emphasized Black’s suspicion of
the Catholic church, and his early involvement in the Ku
Klux Klan, as evidence that modern Establishment Clause
doctrine is contaminated with bias.238

Yet the more

important factor in explaining his approach to the
235

Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
Id. at 430.
237
Id. at 435.
238
See Hamburger, supra note 51, at 422-34, 461-63; John T. McGreevy,
Catholicism and American Freedom: A History 184-86 (2003); Thomas C.
Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 Loy. U.
Chi. L.J. 121, 127-29 (2001). A different psychological explanation is
offered by Noah Feldman, who speculates that Black was reacting to the
atrocities of World War II. Feldman, supra note 15, at 173-75.
236
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Establishment Clause is that he was raised a Baptist.

By

the time he wrote Engel, he was no longer formally
affiliated with any church239 – he told his son, “I cannot
believe.

But I can’t not believe either.”240 – but he

continued to hold a typically Baptist view of the
corrupting effects of establishment.241

The corruption

claim, as he states it in the passages just quoted, could
have been written by Backus or Leland.
A much shrewder critique of Black was offered
immediately after Everson and McCollum by the Catholic
theologian John Courtney Murray.

Murray argued that the

idea of separation that underlay these decisions depended
on “a particular sectarian concept of ‘religion.’”242

The

idea that religion is a fundamentally private and
individual matter, one that can never be expressed in
communal ritual, depends, Murray argued, on “a deistic
version of fundamentalist Protestantism.”243

The idea of an

absolute ban on assistance to religion “even in the
239

He occasionally attended services at a Unitarian church. Newman,
supra note 223, at 521.
240
See Black, supra note 224, at 172.
241
He also had a typically Baptist view of the primacy of individual
conscience, as in his opinion for a plurality in Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), in which he held that even those who did
not believe in God could claim a religious exemption from the draft.
He wrote that the law “exempts from military service all those whose
consciences, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to
become a part of an instrument of war.” Id. at 344.
242
Murray, supra note 3, at 29.
243
Id. at 31.
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demonstrable absence of any coercion of conscience, any
inhibition of full religious liberty, any violation of
civil equality, any disruption of social harmony”244 cannot
be sustained without this religious premise, he thought.
Responding to Justice Rutledge’s claim that separation “is
best for the state and best for religion,”245 he asked:

“by

what constitutional authority is the Supreme Court
empowered to legislate as to what is ‘best for religion’?
I thought church and state were separated here.”246
Murray was on shakier ground when he claimed that
“Madison’s radically individualistic concept of religion”
was “today quite passé.”247

In fact, as we have seen, the

individualistic premise was pervasive in the thought of the
founding period.
The problem about the religious roots of the
corruption argument is nonetheless a pressing one, and for
just the reason that Murray notes.

A rule against

establishment of religion ought not itself to establish a
religion.

The point is a powerful one, and it is

remarkable that so little has been made of it since Murray
wrote.

244
245
246
247

Id. at 30.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Murray, supra note 3, at 30 n.33.
Id. at 29 n.29.

90

IV.

The troublesome religious roots

Now that we have examined the argument for corruption
as it was deployed by the founding generation, we can ask
whether any of this matters for contemporary constitutional
interpretation.

It is clear that the corruption argument

mattered to the framers, and that they thought that
preventing corruption of religion was one of the purposes
of barring establishments of religion.

Can that offer us

any guidance in interpreting the clause today?
The role of original meaning is contested in
constitutional law.

But it’s generally agreed that, when a

provision is aimed at a specific historical evil, the
provision should be read as preventing a recurrence of that
evil or others relevantly like it.

Of course, there is

room for disagreement as to what counts as other evils
relevantly like it.

For that, we have to look at what the

problem is and offer an account of why it makes sense to
remedy it.
help us.

For such an account, the original meaning won’t

The prohibition rarely arrives with a rule for

its interpretation, and often the framers had no specific
interpretive rule in mind.248

When the authors of the first

248

Thus, for example, Leonard Levy has shown that, at the time of the
framing of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, neither James
Madison nor anyone else had figured out that the protection of free
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amendment condemned establishment, Thomas Curry notes,
“they had in their minds an image of tyranny, not a
definition of a system.”249
Jed Rubenfeld has observed that constitutional
interpretation is frequently guided by paradigm cases,
which are specific core commitments that are memorialized
by the constitutional provisions.
Fourteenth Amendment.

An example is the

The Amendment’s language is broad,

but it was enacted specifically in order to outlaw the
Black Codes – laws enacted by white-controlled legislatures
after the Civil War, that imposed specific legal
disabilities on blacks, such as requiring them to be
gainfully employed under contacts of long duration,
excluding them from occupations other than manual labor,
and disabling them from testifying against whites in
court.250

Any plausible interpretation of the Fourteenth

Amendment must invalidate the Black Codes.

More generally,

any interpretation that specifies the more general types of
inequality that the Amendment forbids must be a chain of

speech must prevent the state from punishing seditious libel, even
though this core meaning of the Clause would shortly be argued by
Madison in his critique of the Sedition Act a few years later. Leonard
W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press (1985).
249
See Curry, supra note 52, at 211. The Court has similarly observed
that the purpose of the Framers of the First Amendment “was to state an
objective, not to write a statute.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
668 (1970).
250
See Theodore Brantner Wilson, The Black Codes of the South (1965).

92

inferences from the core commitment represented by the
paradigm case.251
Similarly with other constitutional provisions that
are aimed at specific evils.

The Fourth Amendment’s ban on

unreasonable searches and seizures should be read in light
of the controversies over general searches and writs of
assistance before the American Revolution.252

The contract

clause should be read as a response to debtor relief
legislation in the 1780s.253

If original meaning is to

count at all, then a constitutional provision must be
understood to address the very problem that it was designed
to address.
Unless it states a specific rule, it must also be
understood to stand for some principle.

That principle

must be a principle that addresses the very problem that
the provision was designed to address.

But it cannot

simply be a rule that addresses that problem and nothing
more.

If the framers had intended to do that, they could

have said so, and they didn’t.

251

Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time: A Theory of Constitutional SelfGovernment 178-195 (2001). The idea that constitutional provisions
should be interpreted in light of paradigm cases is, of course, hardly
original with Rubenfeld; see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and
the Religion Clauses, 4 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 683, 690
(1990); but Rubenfeld lays out the argument with unusual clarity and
detail.
252
Jed Rubenfeld, Revolution By Judiciary: The Structure of American
Constitutional Law 32-33 (2005).
253
Laycock, supra note 251, at 690.
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The Establishment Clause is a particularly apt
candidate for paradigm case interpretation, since the core
historical wrong that is intended to be barred – here, an
establishment of religion, of the kind that existed in
England – is specifically named in the text.254
Paradigm case reasoning proceeds by “extrapolating
general principles from the foundational paradigm cases and
applying those principles to the controversy at hand.”255
With respect to provisions such as the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, which prohibit certain government actions, the
general principle should give a convincing account of the
result in the paradigm case while at the same time properly
specifying the kind of evil that the prohibition reaches.
The principle should explain what kind of wrong the
provision is prohibiting, so that in subsequent
controversies, it is possible to tell whether the same kind
of wrong is or is not occurring.
In Establishment Clause cases, then, to the extent
that one wants to rely on original meaning – and I am by no
means suggesting that this should be the sole source of
constitutional law256 – one should ask, (1) why did the

254

Rubenfeld briefly discusses the interpretation of the Establishment
Clause in Rubenfeld, supra note 252, at 29-30.
255
See Rubenfeld, supra note 251, at 191.
256
In fact, original meaning is more conventionally taken to be one of
several sources of constitutional meaning, along with text, precedent,
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framers think establishment of religion is a bad thing, and
(2) is the same bad thing brought about by the challenged
action in this case?

There will obviously be room for

disagreement about both of these issues.

The paradigm case

method does not decide cases, but it makes clear which
questions the judges should ask.
With respect to the first question, why the framers
thought establishment was a bad thing, the corruption
argument is indisputably relevant.

It was only one of the

reasons why establishment was thought bad, but it was a
consideration that played an important role, and so the
clause should be read in light of it.
At the same time, the original argument for corruption
cannot be used today without modification.

In that

original form, it is crucially dependent on Protestant or
Deist premises.

Today, Deism has disappeared, and the

largest religious denomination in the United States is
Catholicism.257

More generally, an interpretation of the

Establishment Clause that relies on specific, contested
theological premises is inconsistent with the purpose of

and much else. The classic catalogue of sources of Constitutional Law
is Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution
(1982).
257
This is why modern defenders of nonestablishment cannot simply invoke
the original religious arguments to defend their position. See, e.g.,
Marci A. Hamilton and Rachel Steamer, The Religious Origins of
Disestablishment Principles, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1755 (2006).
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the Clause.

The trouble is that the corruption argument

has a paradoxical and potentially self-nullifying quality:
the corruption claim can always be applied to the
understanding of religion that is the basis for any
specific corruption claim.

So in order to be usable now,

the argument will need some translation.
To begin this exercise in reconstruction, let us
enumerate the recurring claims that fall under the rubric
of “corruption.”

A.

The claims distilled

Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of
religious value.

From this premise some, but hardly all,

commentators have inferred that the religion that the state
can promote is likely to be worthless. The idea that
religious sincerity is crucial to salvation, and that one
should follow one’s own conscientious beliefs even in the
teeth of contrary religious authority, was endorsed as
early as Pope Innocent III (1198-1216):
endure excommunication rather than sin

“One ought to
. . . no one ought

to act against his own conscience and he should follow his
conscience rather than the judgment of the church when he
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is certain . . . one ought to suffer any evil rather than
sin against conscience.”258

Noah Feldman observes that the

idea of freedom of conscience is already being suggested by
this kind of argument:

“If it was sinful to act against

conscience, then there might be reason to avoid requiring
anyone to act against conscience.”259
inchoate.

But here it is only

Aquinas, who held basically the same view as

Innocent, did not suggest that conscience entailed
religious toleration.

On the contrary, he supported the

persecution of heretics.260

The present populations of

South America and Africa are ample evidence that state
coercion can eventually bring about many people’s sincere
adherence to the favored religious belief.

Additional

premises appear to be necessary in order for this argument
to be a constraint on state power.

258

Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: An Historical Perspective, in John
Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver, Religious Human Rights in Global
Perspective 25 (1996)(quoting Ordinary Gloss to the Decretals, which
explained two judgments by Innocent).
259
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause,
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 346, 357 (2002).
260
St. Thomas Aquinas, Selected Political Writings 77-79 (A.P.
D’Entreves ed. 1981). There is some tension within this position,
since the heretic may be exercising his own rational faculties to the
best of his ability. Aquinas found it necessary to deny this, and to
claim that the heretic is willfully denying the truth. See David
Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 87-88 (1986). “Aquinas did
not make clear whether he believed that a well informed conscience
could ever be in conflict with ecclesiastical authority.” Michael G.
Baylor, Action and Person: Conscience in Late Scholasticism and the
Young Luther 57 n.138 (1977). Contemporary Catholicism takes a very
different view. Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration on Religious Freedom]
(1965) declares the right of individuals to seek the truth in religious
matters, even if they follow false religions.
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Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinal
divisions.

In fact, a variety of religious positions have

religious value.

State-induced religious uniformity

therefore attacks the very value it seeks to promote.

This

goes beyond Aquinas, because it holds that heresy is not a
harm against which the state can legitimately protect the
public.

It may not be a harm at all.

This may be because

the theological differences at issue are not really that
important.

Or it may be because the differences that are

likely to bother the state are unlikely to be the ones that
matter, or even that the state is likely to promote the
wrong views, as Milton, Locke, and Madison argued.

It may

be that false religious views have positive value because
engagement with them brings us closer to the truth, as
Milton, Pufendorf, and Jefferson thought.

This claim also

supports the next argument:
The state is an unreliable source of religious
authority.

In part this follows from the above.

To those

who have been on the losing side of state-imposed
uniformity, it is also an inference from experience.

Note,

however, that since the corruption argument is itself
religious, it has inherent limits:

the state evidently is

not so unreliable that it cannot discern religious value
when that value is described at this level of abstraction.
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In order to make any use at all of the corruption argument,
the state must be competent to say what is religious.
Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a
pernicious way, if the teachers are agents of the state.
This can be derived from theological premises, as in Roger
Williams.

It may also be an inference from experience, but

if it is, it presupposes some idea of what it means for a
change in religion to be pernicious.

That idea cannot be

religiously neutral.
Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt
toward religion.

This, too, is an inference from

experience.
The legitimate authority of the state does not extend
to religious questions.

This can be derived from a kind of

social contract argument, and Locke so derived it, in an
argument independent of his theological arguments.

But it

also follows from the above.
All of these arguments depend on some conception of
the good of religion which is being promoted by the
corruption argument.
like today?

What could such a conception look

It’s clear what it can’t be:

an unmediated

connection with God arrived at through personal study of
the New Testament, as Milton and Elisha Williams wrote and
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many of the other writers we have surveyed may have
thought.

B.

What could take its place?

Scalia’s reformulation

As Jared Goldstein has observed, a rule that the state
may not examine the merits of religious practices and
beliefs depends on the premise that the state can tell what
religion is.
rule.261

Otherwise, it is impossible to follow the

But the discernment of what religion is itself

appears to present a religious question.

The problem

becomes more acute once it is noted that the corruption
argument depends on the premise that religion is a good
thing.

Then we have to ask, what is this good thing?

Is

it possible to answer that question without committing
oneself on controversial religious questions?
Larry Alexander argues that, if religion is accommodated
because it is a good thing, then one should only
accommodate the true religion.

If duties to God have

261

Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine?
Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54
Catholic U. L. Rev. 497 (2005).
The same analytic point is made in
another context by David Strauss, who shows that a color-blindness rule
is necessarily intensely race-conscious. The Myth of Colorblindness,
1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 199. For engagement with Goldstein’s arguments, see
Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious
Neutrality, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009).
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priority over duties to the state, this priority only holds
with respect to real rather than imagined duties to God. In
order to apply this rationale, the state would have to
decide what the true religion is and to exempt only that
religion’s believers from generally applicable laws.262

In

the context of the corruption argument, a variation on
Alexander’s claim would be that the state should figure out
which religious beliefs fell within the range of
neighboring differences that had religious value, and then
keep its hands off only those beliefs.

That was the

position of all of those proponents of disestablishment who
drew the line at certain religious beliefs that they
thought were obviously false and destructive, such as
atheism or Catholicism.263
Something like this formulation has been proposed by
Justice Antonin Scalia.

He offers his approach as a

solution to the free exercise/establishment dilemma. “We
have not yet come close to reconciling [the requirement
that government not advance religion] and our Free Exercise
cases, and typically we do not really try.”264

The solution

262

See Larry Alexander, Good God, Garvey! The Inevitability and
Impossibility of a Religious Justification of Free Exercise Exemptions,
47 Drake L. Rev. 35 (1998).
263
See Milton, supra note 54, at 747; Locke, supra note 94, at 50;
Williams, supra note 108, at 93.
264
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 617 (1987)(Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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he, Justice Thomas, and the late Chief Justice Rehnquist
have proposed would impose dramatic limits upon the
Establishment Clause.

They would read the Clause only to

prohibit favoritism among sects, while permitting states to
favor religion over irreligion. Of this group, Scalia has
offered the clearest formulation of the alternative rule:
“our constitutional tradition . . . ruled out of order
government-sponsored endorsement of religion

. . . where

the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of specifying
details upon which men and women who believe in a
benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world are
known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ.)"265
More recently, in McCreary County v. ACLU,266
dissenting from a decision barring one ceremonial display
of the Ten Commandments, he frankly acknowledged that
ceremonial theism would entail “contradicting the beliefs
of some people that there are many gods, or that God or the
gods pay no attention to human affairs.”267

The

Commandments “are assuredly a religious symbol, but they
are not so closely associated with a single religious
belief that their display can reasonably be understood as
preferring one religious sect over another. The Ten
265

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
267
Id. at 893 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
266
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Commandments are recognized by Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam alike as divinely given.”268

Justice Stevens objected

that “[t]here are many distinctive versions of the
Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even
different denominations within a particular faith; to a
pious and learned observer, these differences may be of
enormous religious significance.”269

Scalia (here joined

by Rehnquist, Thomas, and Kennedy) retorted that “The
sectarian dispute regarding text, if serious, is not widely
known. I doubt that most religious adherents are even aware
that there are competing versions with doctrinal
consequences (I certainly was not).”270

Justice Scalia thus

envisions a role for the Court in which it decides which
articles of faith are sufficiently widely shared to be
eligible for state endorsement (and in which determinedly
uneducable judicial ignorance is a source of law!).
Evidently, the state may endorse any religious proposition
so long as that proposition is (or is believed by a judge
unacquainted with doctrinal niceties to be) a matter of
268

Id. at 909. There is a delicious ambiguity, which I won’t pursue
further here, about what it means to be “associated with a single
religious belief.” If the Ten Commandments are not so associated, then
neither is the divinity of Christ, since Protestants and Catholics who
violently disagree on many religious issues are nonetheless in
agreement about that.
269
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717-18 (2005)(Stevens, J.,
dissenting), citing Steven Lubet, The Ten Commandments in Alabama, 15
Const. Commentary 471, 474-476 (Fall 1998).
270
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 909 n. 12 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Kennedy, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
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agreement between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

It

would, for instance, be permissible for the state to
declare that Gabriel is one of the most important
archangels.

The interpretation of the establishment clause

would then depend on the further development of the Moslem
idea of the People of the Book – those who have received a
revelation that is deemed (formerly by the Koran, now by
the Supreme Court) to be reliably from God.
Like Backus or Adams, Scalia’s vision of state
incompetence is limited only to certain theological
propositions.
of Christ.

The state must not adjudicate the divinity

But it is only disagreement among monotheists

that the state must keep its hands off.

It can

authoritatively and reliably pronounce its views on the
question of theism.271
Scalia’s solution will not work, because it
discriminates among religions.

Chief Justice Rehnquist

thought that the establishment clause forbids “asserting a
preference for one religious denomination or sect over

271

For a similar criticism of the nonpreferentialist position, see Lee
v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-18 (1992)(Souter, J., concurring). A
defender of Scalia might say that there is a difference between saying
that the state can discern the broadest religious truths (probably
Locke’s position about atheism) and saying (as Scalia does) that the
state can discern a consensus or historical tradition and act to
reflect the consensus view. As the development of Scalia’s position
makes clear, this distinction is unsustainable in practice.
“Acknowledgement” easily slides into endorsement. Thanks to Kent
Greenawalt for pressing me on this point.
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others.”272

Scalia once agreed:

“I have always believed,

and all my opinions are consistent with the view, that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion
over others.”273

Not all religions involve a belief in “a

benevolent, omnipotent Creator and Ruler of the world.”274
Scalia’s formulation does discriminate among religions.
Christians, Jews, and Moslems are in; Hindus, Buddhists,
and atheists are out.

And the outs are a lot of people.

Justice Scalia defended his approach by noting that the
monotheistic religions “combined account for 97.7% of all
believers.”275

But he’s fudging the numbers:

in

calculating the level of exclusion here, nonbelievers are
doubly excluded, since they are not even entitled to be
part of the denominator.

If one adds the nonbelievers, as

enumerated in the 2004 Statistical Abstract of the United
272

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985)(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
273
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 748
(1994)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
274
The Court held long ago that the Establishment Clause forbids
government to “aid those religions based on a belief in the existence
of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). The Court noted that
“[a]mong religions in this country, which do not teach what would
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others.” Ibid. at 495
n.11. To say that Buddhism rejects theism is something of an
overstatement. While the historical Buddha had no interest in
theological questions, some forms of Buddhism make theological claims,
sometimes assigning divine status to Buddha himself. For a general
overview of these issues, see Masao Abe, Buddhism, in Arvind Sharma
ed., Our Religions 69-137 (1993). Hinduism is only the most prominent
of many polytheistic religions. There are, concededly, monotheistic
interpretations of Hinduism, but not all Hindus subscribe to these.
275
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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States which Scalia cites, the excluded adult population is
33 million out of 207 million, or 16 percent.276
The numbers are in fact a bit more complicated than
the Statistical Abstract suggests.

The proportion of

Americans who report having no religious preference doubled
in the 1990s, from 7 percent in 1991 (which had been its
level for almost 20 years) to 14 percent in 1998.

However,

most of the members of this category are in fact religious.
More than half believe in God, more than half believe in
life after death, about a third believe in heaven and hell,
and 93 percent sometimes pray.

The most careful study of

this group concludes that the newer members of this group
are mostly “unchurched believers” who declare no religious
preference in an effort to express their distance from the
Religious Right.277
It is pretty clear that these people are not
interested in being part of the theistic triumphalism that
Scalia wants to license.

Similarly, Steven Gey observes

that, in order to calculate the number of people excluded

276

U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 20042005 (124th ed. 2004), at 55; cited in id. Further data on the number
of people Scalia is leaving out are compiled in Frederick Mark Gedicks
and Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity and the Ten
Commandments, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 275, 284-85 (2007). The data on which
the Census Bureau relies is described in detail in Barry A. Kosmin and
Ariela Keysar, Religion in a Free Market (2006).
277
Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No
Religious Preference: Politics and Generations, 67 Am. Sociological
Rev. 165 (2002).
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from Scalia’s formula, one ought also to include the large
number of theists who reject state sponsorship of religion,
including “[t]raditional Roger Williams-style Baptists,
Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, most Jews,
many Presbyterians, and other modern nonfundamentalist
Protestants.”278

Scalia does not explain his indifference

to these people while he conspicuously includes Jews and
Moslems, who together comprise fewer than 4 million
Americans.279
Scalia’s position is essentially that the state may take
one side in the modern culture wars, in favor of
traditionalists and against modernists.

It may not be

irrelevant that the traditionalists have become an
important constituency of the Republican party.280

This

kind of religious division, with the coercive power of the
278

Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. Va. L.
Rev. 1, 20 (2007).
279
As Gey notes, most Jews are separationists who aren’t interested in
being included in Scalia’s numerator.
280
See Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural
Conflict in American Party Politics (2001); Wuthnow, supra note 33, at
218-22. The effect has become more pronounced over time. In the 2004
presidential election, those attending church more than once a week
voted for Bush by a margin of 65 percent to 35 percent, while those who
never attend church were almost the inverse: 36 percent to 62 percent.
Among Orthodox Jews, 69 percent voted for Bush, while Conservative Jews
gave him 23 percent and Reform Jews 15 percent. Bush won 40 percent of
the votes of Jews attending synagogue on a weekly basis, compared to 18
percent of those who rarely or never attend. Jay Lefkowitz, The
Election and the Jewish Vote, Commentary, Feb. 2005, at 61.
It may also be relevant that the “originalist” credentials of
Scalia’s position are deeply flawed, suggesting that he is basing his
position on something other than the intentions of the framers. See
Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, Nw.
U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009).
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state as the prize for which the religious factions
struggle, is one of the central evils that the religion
clauses aim at preventing.

One may also wonder why he

thinks that the state’s competence extends to this
particular set of religious question, when he concedes its
incompetence with respect to so many others.
Perhaps Scalia’s central concern is to promote a certain
kind of civic unity which recognition of religion makes
possible.

This is clearest in his dissent from a decision

invalidating a high school graduation prayer:
The Founders of our Republic knew the fearsome
potential of sectarian religious belief to generate
civil dissension and civil strife. And they also knew
that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to
foster among religious believers of various faiths a
toleration-- no, an affection--for one another than
voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God
whom they all worship and seek. Needless to say, no
one should be compelled to do that, but it is a shame
to deprive our public culture of the opportunity, and
indeed the encouragement, for people to do it
voluntarily. The Baptist or Catholic who heard and
joined in the simple and inspiring prayers of Rabbi
Gutterman on this official and patriotic occasion was
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inoculated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a
manner that cannot be replicated. To deprive our
society of that important unifying mechanism, in order
to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in
respectful nonparticipation, is as senseless in policy
as it is unsupported in law.281
Social unity, he evidently thinks, depends on shared norms.
The problem with his prescription of official
monotheism is that Baptists and Catholics and Jews can
indeed be part of the overlapping consensus he
contemplates, but we live in a society that also includes
millions who aren’t monotheists.

Charles Taylor’s point

about the limitations of a common ground strategy are
salient here.

If the aim is shared agreement, then it is

counterproductive to propose unifying principles that large
numbers of citizens cannot possibly agree to.
the remainder matters.

The size of

Perhaps Scalia’s solution made

sense in the 1950s, when the idea of a “Judeo-Christian”
overlapping consensus was invented,282 but it is no longer
appropriate in contemporary American society.283

281
282
283

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Silk, supra note 215, at 40-53.
See generally Gedicks and Hendrix, supra note 276.
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Overlapping consensus is unstable and constantly under
construction.
Scalia is right about the importance of shared norms.
A sense of solidarity is indispensable to democracy:

if

majorities are to rule legitimately, then the losers need
to feel that they have some stake in the system.

A sense

of solidarity is also necessary to a functioning welfare
state.

The split between American liberals and the

religious has greatly truncated the possibilities for a
transformative left politics.284
As the common ground shrinks, however, its basis must
become more abstract and vague.
longer do the job.

Christianity will no

Neither will monotheism.

But the idea

that religion is something of value, and that that value is
jeopardized when religious questions are adjudicated by the
state, may continue to provide the common ground that is
needed.
The pluralism we now face was not imagined by the
framers.

It is therefore impossible to attribute to them

any view about it.

Protestant Christianity was so

pervasive in their culture that they did not even consider
whether its establishment was inconsistent with religious

284

See Garry Wills, Under God:

Religion and American Politics (1990).
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liberty.285

Modern religious pluralism has generated new

knowledge about the range of religious issues that are
potentially subject to corruption by state interference.

V.

A.

A proposal

Defining religion

What, then, is the “religion” that the state must keep
its hands off?
Religion is a category that is hard to delimit.286

The

best treatments of the problem of defining “religion” for
constitutional purposes, most prominently that of Kent
Greenawalt, have concluded that no dictionary definition
will do, because no single feature unites all the things
that are indisputably religions. Religions just have a
“family resemblance” to one another. In doubtful cases, one

285

Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim
About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 918-19 (1986); Curry,
supra note 52, at 218, 221.
286
Many writers have tried to evade this problem by saying that what is
to be protected is not religion, but conscience. The reasons why this
stratagem will not work are explored in Andrew Koppelman, Conscience,
Volitional Necessity, and Religious Exemptions (unpublished ms.).
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can only ask how close the analogy is between a putative
instance of religion and the indisputable instances.287
This process need not yield indeterminacy.

The concept

of “family resemblance” is drawn from the philosophy of
Ludwig Wittgenstein, who famously argued that “the meaning
of a word is its use in the language.”288

Thus, for

example, there is no single thing common to “games” which
makes them all games, but “similarities, relationships, and
a whole series of them at that.”289

The use of the word

“game” is thus not circumscribed by any clear rule.

But

that does not mean that it is not circumscribed at all.
“[N]o more are there any rules for how high one throws the
ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all
of that and has rules too.”290

287
See William P. Alston, Religion, in 7 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 142
(Paul Edwards ed. 1967); George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for
the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 Geo. L.J. 1519 (1983);
Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 Cal.
L. Rev. 753 (1984); Tribe, supra note 23, at 1181-83; Eduardo Peñalver,
Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 Yale L.J. 791 (1997); Greenawalt,
supra note 39, at 124-156; Koppelman, supra note 6, at 125-139. Courts
in Europe have done no better in devising a definition. Rex Ahdar and
Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State 110-26 (2005). Lest
one think that the neo-Wittgensteinian approach advocated here is an
artifact of academic preciousness, note that an analogical criterion is
also used by that singularly hardheaded entity, the Internal Revenue
Service. See Defining “Religious Organization” and “Church,” 868 Tax
Mgm’t & Port. (BNA) III (2007).
288
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1958).
289
Id. at 31.
290
Id. at 33.
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Explaining Wittgenstein’s idea here, Charles Taylor
observes that, with respect to a great many rule-guided
social practices,
the “rule” lies essentially in the practice.

The rule

is what is animating the practice at any given time, and
not some formulation behind it, inscribed in our
thoughts or our brains or our genes, or whatever.
That’s why the rule is, at any time, what the practice
has made it.291
The rules of appropriate comportment when riding on a bus,
for instance, are not codified anywhere.

But natives of

the culture may understand quite well what they are, and
there may be no doubt at all as to how they apply in
particular cases, even if they have not been codified and
could not be codified.292
The definition of religion in American law appears to
work just this way.

There is no set of necessary and

sufficient conditions that will make something a
“religion.”

But it is remarkable how few cases have arisen

291

Charles Taylor, To Follow a Rule, in Philosophical Arguments 178
(1995).
292
See Al Yankovic, Another One Rides the Bus (Placebo Records 1981).
As Jonathan Z. Smith has observed, the term “religion” denotes an
anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western practice
of encountering and accounting for foreign belief systems associated
with geopolitical entities with which the West was forced to deal.
Religion, Religions, Religious, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies
269 (Mark C. Taylor ed. 1998). Arising thus out of a specific
historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways thereafter,
“religion” would be surprising if it had any essential denotation.
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in which courts have had real difficulty in determining
whether something is a religion or not.293
In the context of the hands-off rule, religion should be
understood by reference to a set of ultimate questions that
the state must not try to answer.

But the state can

recognize and promote the good of religion, understood at a
certain level of abstraction.

Neutrality is fluid; it is

available in many specifications.294
is one defensible specification.

The American approach

The state is agnostic

about religion, but it is an interested and sympathetic
agnosticism.

The state does not say “I don’t know and you

don’t either.”

Rather it declares the value of religion in

a carefully noncommittal way:
out.

“It would be good to find

And we encourage your efforts to do that.”

The precise character of the good being promoted is
itself deliberately left vague, because the broad consensus
on freedom of religion would surely collapse if we had to
state with specificity the value promoted by religion.
“Religion” denotes a cluster of goods, including salvation

293

The list of reported cases that have had to determine a definition of
“religion” is a remarkably short one. See Religion, 36C Words and
Phrases 153-57 (2002 & supp. 2008). A recent survey laments the
absence of a clear definition, but offers no evidence that the courts
have had any trouble deciding cases as a result. Jeffrey L. Oldham,
Note, Constitutional “Religion”: A Survey of First Amendment
Definitions of Religion, 6 Tex. F. on C.L. & C.R. 117 (2001).
294
See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. OF POLITICS
633 (2004).
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(if you think you need to be saved), harmony with the
transcendent origin of universal order (if it exists),295
responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of
human life (if it is imperfect),296 courage in the face of
the heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind
of encouragement helps),297 a transcendent underpinning for
the resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning
helps),298 contact with that which is awesome and
indescribable (if awe is something you feel),299 and many
others.

No general description of the good that religion

seeks to promote can be satisfactory, politically or
intellectually.300

The establishment clause permits the

state to favor religion so long as “religion” is understood
very broadly, forbidding any discrimination or preference
among religions or religious propositions.
295

John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 89-90 (1980).
Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction
17-34 (1999).
297
Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952).
298
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997); Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone (1794; New York: Harper, 1960).
299
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (2d ed. 1950).
300
Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of
religion:
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be
established. I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful
élans and aspirations which humans have manifested in the
spiritual realm, and relate them to some single set of underlying
needs or aims or tendencies (whether it be the desire for meaning
or something else). The phenomena are much too varied and
baffling for that; and even if they were more tractable, we would
have to stand at the end of history to be able to draw such
conclusions.
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 679 (2007).
296

115

This understanding makes it possible to defend
accommodations without running into the free
exercise/establishment dilemma.

The state is recognizing

the value of religion, but it is making no claims about
religious truth.

It is the making of such claims that

violates the establishment clause.
This understanding also provides a basis for the hands
off rule.

Each of these understandings of the good of

religion is manipulable for political purposes.
likely to be abused.

Each is

There is no reason to trust the state

to resolve religious questions.

The incompetence and

futility extend to the deepest religious divisions today.
Recall the basic elements of the claim that
establishment corrupts religion.
Religious behavior, without sincerity, is devoid of
religious value.

Each of the understandings of the good of

religion that I have described at least has a personal
dimension, even if it also has communal aspects.

So

hypocrisy is a ubiquitous worry, and state efforts to nudge
citizens toward a particular religious view conduces to
hypocrisy.

Of course the nudge may be gentle, and if it is

gentle enough, it is unlikely to produce this particular
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pathology and may be quite effective.301

So this argument

needs supplementation if it is to support as broad a handsoff rule as the Court has adopted.
Establishment exaggerates the importance of doctrinal
divisions.

In fact, a variety of religious positions have

religious value.

This follows from the premise that

everything in the cluster should be treated as
participating in the value of religion.

The cluster

conception of religion is essentially pluralistic.
religions reject this premise, of course.

Some

But their

adherents may nonetheless be persuaded that religious
liberty will be more secure if the state is required to act
as though this premise were true.
The state is an unreliable source of religious
authority.
Religious teachings are likely to be altered, in a
pernicious way, if the teachers are agents of the state.
Establishment tends to produce undeserved contempt
toward religion.
All of these may be treated as inferences from
experience.

The most notable datum that has presented

itself since the framing is the frequently noted fact that

301

See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:
Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607 (2000).
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in Europe, with its established churches, religion is
withering away; in the United States, it is thriving.302
One may also note the unattractive ways in which religion
is transformed when the state tries to embrace it in a
politically acceptable way.

Steven Goldberg’s book

Bleached Faith does this in some detail, noting that when
the state displays the Ten Commandments, it typically does
so in forms that deprive it of any meaning; that the
movement to teach “intelligent design” in the schools
demotes God to the status of a second-rate engineer of
biological minutiae; that the promotion of Christmas
produces a bland, commercialized Christianity while
distorting the place of Hanukkah in the Jewish calendar.303
These examples have limited power, because they will move
some people more than others.

All the argument needs in

order to be effective, however, is that audiences be able
to think of some illustrations of these propositions.
The legitimate authority of the state does not extend
to religious questions.
above.

This follows from all of the

It entails a hands-off rule with respect to

theological questions.

302
303

See Casanova, supra note 209.
Goldberg, supra note 209.
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Implicit in the hands off rule is something analogous
to the civil religion that Robert Bellah has observed is
implicit in American practice.

Bellah observes that there

are “certain common elements of religious orientation that
the great majority of Americans share” and that “provide a
religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life,
including the political sphere.”304

This orientation, which

he labeled “the American civil religion,”305 included as its
tenets “the existence of God, the life to come, the reward
of virtue and the punishment of vice, and the exclusion of
religious intolerance.”306

This civil religion does not,

however, include such controversial matters as the divinity
of Jesus Christ.

“The God of the civil religion is not

only rather ‘unitarian,’ he is also on the austere side,
much more related to order, law, and right than to
salvation and love.”307
Robert Wuthnow observes that the American civil
religion described by Bellah has been fragmenting in recent
years into two very different visions.308

A conservative

narrative holds that America’s government is legitimate
because it reflects biblical principles and has the
304
Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, in Beyond Belief:
Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World 171 (1970).
305
Id.
306
Id. at 172.
307
Id. at 175.
308
See Wuthnow, supra note 33, at 241-67.
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potential to evangelize the world.

A liberal narrative

holds that America has a responsibility to use its vast
resources to alleviate the material problems that face the
world.

In this liberal narrative, “[f]aith plays a role

chiefly as a motivating element, supplying strength to keep
going against what often appear as insuperable odds.”309
The two visions have become increasingly hostile to one
another.

As a consequence, neither can effectively claim

to speak for common American values.
The civil religion implied by the hands off rule
cannot by itself provide such common values.
does it preclude them.

It is even more abstract than

Bellah’s Unitarian civic God.
without predicates.310

But neither

It is a negative God, a God

The hands off rule reveals its

reverence for the Absolute by omitting all reference to it
in public decisionmaking.

The aspiration should be for an

eloquent silence, like a rest in music.

B.

The shaping of modern religion

The usefulness of an exceedingly abstract conception
of the value of religion is reinforced by the recent work
309

Id. at 251.
See Anthony Kenny, Worshipping an Unknown God, 19 Ratio (n.s.) 441
(2006).
310
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of Charles Taylor on the history and character of modern
secularity.

Taylor argues that the emergence of a world in

which religiosity is one option among others has roots in
Christian theology.

From this he infers that the gap

between religiosity and secularism is less profound than
many think; “both emerge from the same long process of
Reform in Latin Christendom.”311
In the primitive world of nature rituals and tribal
deities, there was no clear distinction between the
immanent and the transcendent.
pervaded everything.

The sense of cosmic order

The individual was deeply embedded in

this world; there were no clear boundaries between self and
nonself, personal agency and impersonal force.

Possession

by demons was a real and terrifying possibility.

In such

circumstances, unbelief was literally unthinkable.312
Around the middle of the first millennium B.C., the
great world faiths appeared.

(Following Karl Jaspers,

Taylor calls this moment the “Axial Revolution.”)
Confucius, Lao-tse, Siddhartha Gautama, the Hebrew
prophets, Socrates, and Plato brought new visions of
universal ethics and individual salvation.
drawn between sacred and profane.

311
312

A new line was

A world that had been

See Taylor, supra note 300, at 675.
Id. at 25-89.
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unified was now divided between the disordered lower realm
and the higher aspiration toward which individuals were to
strive.313

The new imperative toward moral improvement

produced what Taylor calls “the Great Disembedding,” in
which the individual was separated from his social and
cosmic environments, and Western individualism began.
Taylor focuses on the evolution of the Christian
world.

From the beginning, he argues, there was a tension

in Christianity between salvation for all, promised by a
transcendent God, and the pagan practices and habits of
mind that persisted among the laity.314

The movement that

culminated in the Reformation began in the middle ages.
After the Hildebrandine Reform of the eleventh century,
there were repeated efforts by the Church, first to reform
its own practices, and later to restrain as idolatrous the
veneration of saints and relics, magic, miracle-mongering,
and dancing around the maypole.315

The idea gradually took

hold that everyone, not only the clergy, could practice the
virtues of the Gospel.

Ordinary life, including work,

play, and sex, began to take on sacred meaning.316

313

Id. at 151-53.
Id. at 61-75.
315
Id. at 104, 242-43, 265-66.
316
Id. at 179. The story of the growing affirmation of everyday life is
more fully developed in Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The
Making of the Modern Identity 211-302 (1989).
314
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The Christian virtues were no longer those of
ascetic monks; an ethos of personal responsibility and
self-discipline became available to everyone.

This attempt

to bring Christ into the previously unhallowed world
inspired a new focus on the world.317

Human beings now had

to inhabit the world “as agents of instrumental reason,
working the system effectively in order to bring about
God’s purposes; because it is through these purposes, and
not through signs, that God reveals himself in his
world.”318
This disengaged stance toward a disenchanted world
became the moral basis of the new scientific method.
Technological control of the world became yet another way
of doing God’s work, benefiting the human race in
accordance with His plan.319

The highest goal was

understood to be “a certain kind of human flourishing, in a
context of mutuality, pursuing each his/her happiness on
the basis of assured life and liberty, in a society of
mutual benefit.”320
The this-worldly ethos thus begotten eventually made
it possible to cut loose from religiosity altogether.

317

Taylor, supra note
Id. at 98.
319
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Self, supra note 316,
320
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discussion of Francis Bacon in Sources of the
at 230-33.
300, at 430.

123

“God’s goals for us shrink to the single end of our
encompassing this order of mutual benefit he has designed
for us,”321 it is easy for God to drop out of the picture
completely.

The goal of order becomes simply a matter of

human flourishing, and the power to pursue that goal is a
purely human capacity, not something we receive from God.322
Thus a reforming movement in Christianity was in time
transformed into militant secularism.

In this new vision,

the transcendent aspirations of Christianity are a danger
to the goods of the modern moral order; they risk
fanaticism and estrangement from our own nature.323
Religion is suspect because it posits transcendent goals,
alien to human fulfillment; it is the enemy of human
fulfillment.

Moreover, the problem of theodicy becomes

more acute in a world in which the purposes of the world
are understood to center around human flourishing:

“The

idea of blaming God gets a clearer sense and becomes much
more salient in the modern era where people begin to think
they know just what God was purposing in creating the
world, and can check the results against the intention.”324
But the secular world view has discontents of its own,
manifest in repeated waves of Romantic protest.
321
322
323
324
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Id.
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beget a sense “that something central is missing, some
great purpose, some élan, some fulfillment, without which
life has lost its point.”325

It also cannot offer a good

account of its own commitment to universal benevolence,
which it cannot disentangle fully from its roots in
Christian agape.326
That I am left with human concerns doesn’t tell me to
take universal human welfare as my goal; nor does it
tell me that freedom is important, or fulfillment, or
equality.

Just being confined to human goods could

just as well find expression in my concerning myself
exclusively with my own material welfare, or that of
my family and immediate milieu.

The in fact very

exigent demands of universal justice and benevolence
which characterize modern humanism can’t be explained
just by the subtraction of earlier goals and
allegiances.327
The claim that universal benevolence is just part of human
nature is not especially plausible.

It also can’t account

for “our sense that there is something higher, nobler, more
fully human about universal sympathy.”328

It is unclear how

this benevolence can be sustained in the face of the
325
326
327
328

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
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manifest shortcomings of actual human beings.329

A secular

world view has notorious problems of its own in dealing
with the facts of suffering and evil.330

It is because

secular language finds it difficult to articulate the force
of ethical demands, or for that matter creative human
agency and the power of artistic experience, that many
people find religious language indispensable.331
The two polar positions, secularism and religious
belief, are each animated, for many of their adherents, by
pictures of the world in which the other position is simply
unimaginable.332

“What pushes us one way or the other is

what we might describe as our over-all take on human life,
and its cosmic and (if any) spiritual surroundings.”333

It

is possible to feel some of the force of each opposing
position, to stand “in that open space where you can feel
the winds pulling you, now to belief, now to unbelief,” but
“this feat is relatively rare.”334
What is far more common is to occupy some intermediate
space between the polar positions.335

There has for the

past few centuries been a growing proliferation of views
329

Id. at
Id. at
331
Id. at
332
Id. at
is a case
333
Id. at
334
Id. at
335
Id. at
330

697.
680-85.
544, 597.
549. “The spin of closure which is hegemonic in the Academy
in point.” Id.
550.
549.
512.
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that do this, first among the elite and then later
generalized to the whole society.336
[T]he gamut of intermediate positions greatly widens:
many people drop out of active practice while still
declaring themselves as belonging to some confession,
or believing in God.

On another dimension, the gamut

of beliefs in something beyond widens, fewer declaring
belief in a personal God, while more hold to something
like an impersonal force; in other words a wider range
of people express religious beliefs which move outside
Christian orthodoxy.

Following in this line is the

growth of non-Christian religions, particularly those
originating in the Orient, and the proliferation of
New Age modes of practice, of views which bridge the
humanist/spiritual boundary, of practices which link
spirituality and therapy.

On top of this more and

more people adopt what would earlier have been seen as
untenable positions, e.g., they consider themselves
Catholics while not accepting many crucial dogmas, or
they combine Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray
while not being certain they believe.337

336
337

Id. at 423.
Id. at 513.
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This entire historical movement “has opened a space in
which people can wander between and around all these
options without having to land clearly and definitively in
any one.”338

This, Taylor insists, does not mean simply the

decline of religion, but at the same time “a new placement
of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and
social life.

This new placement is now the occasion for

recompositions of spiritual life in new forms, and for new
ways of existing both in and out of relation to God.”339
Whatever position is held depends on its resonance for
the individual.

The reforming emphasis on free faith

inevitably decentralizes; it is contradictory to seek “a
Church tightly held together by a strong hierarchical
authority, which will nevertheless be filled with
practitioners of heartfelt devotion.”340

What matters is

personal insight, without which external formulas are
useless.341

The upshot is an ethic of authenticity, in

which people are encouraged to discover their own way in
the world, to “do their own thing.”342

338

Id. at 351.
Id. at 437.
340
Id. at 466.
341
Id. at 489.
342
Id. at 475; the point is elaborated in Sources of the Self and in
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (1991). This individualist
framework does not necessarily mean that the content will be
individuating; people may find themselves joining powerful religious
communities. Taylor, supra note 300, at 516; this idea is developed in
339
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This complicates any religiously based sense of group
identity.

It is a particular problem in those regimes, of

which the United States is a notable example, in which “the
senses of belonging to group and confession are fused, and
the moral issues of the group’s history tend to be coded in
religious categories.”343

It is hard to think of America as

“one nation under God” when we disagree so radically about
the nature of God.

At the time the Constitution was

framed, a society that tried to realize immanent goods was
understood to be identical with a society obedient to God’s
will.

Because these have come apart, both sides of today’s

culture wars can plausibly claim to be effectuating the
founders’ design.344
It is nonetheless possible to believe that the
fragmentation of religions conceals a larger unity.

This

belief is encapsulated, Taylor observes, in the familiar
American injunction to worship in the church of your
choice.
This supposes that each church doesn’t just operate
for its own ends, in competition, even hostility to
others.

There will inevitably be lots of that.

But

the idea is that there will also be a convergence, a
Charles Taylor, Varieties of Religion Today:
(2002).
343
Taylor, supra note 300, at 458.
344
Id. at 447-48.
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synergy in their ethical effect.

So that together,

they constitute a wider body, a “church” – or at least
those of them do which fit within certain tolerable
limits.345
Those limits have shifted over time:

Catholics were

originally outside; by the mid-twentieth century, Jews and
Catholics were included; the circle has widened again to
include Muslims.346

“Denominationalism implies that

churches are all equally options, and thrives best in a
regime of separation of church and state, de facto if not
de jure.

But on another level, the political entity can be

identified with the broader, over-arching ‘church,’ and
this can be a crucial element in its patriotism.”347
The lesson I draw from Taylor’s magisterial narrative
is that religious fragmentation is an irresistible and
ongoing trend, and that therefore any attempt to define
communal identity in any but the vaguest terms is a
prescription for inevitable division.

A persistent theme

345

Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454, 524.
347
Id. at 454. This, Taylor thinks, has to include overtly religious
participants in public life, so that “God or religion is not precisely
absent from public space, but is central to the personal identities of
individuals or groups, and hence always a possible defining constituent
of political identities. The wise decision may be to distinguish our
political identity from any particular confessional allegiance, but
this principle of separation has constantly to be interpreted afresh in
its application, wherever religion is important in the lives of
substantial bodies of citizens – which means virtually everywhere.”
Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries 193-94 (2004).
346
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in all of the classic accounts of corruption that we
reviewed in Part III was the idea that religion is
individual, and that state interference distorts it.
Modern developments have radicalized this individualistic
tendency, although, as Milton and Roger Williams show, it
was there from the beginning.
The broadening of the American civil religion is a
sensible response to this trend.

There are no longer any

specific theological propositions that constitute the
common ground.

Rather, what unites the various religious

views is a more generalized commitment to the humane
treatment of every human being, the promotion of a culture
of nonviolence and mutual respect.348

The state should not

discriminate among the citizens who share this common
ground.

Taylor’s account also suggests that religious

evolution is a delicate process in which the state is
unlikely to have much to contribute.

The hamhandedness of

any contemporary intervention is the modern face of
corrupting establishment.

VI.

348

See A Global Ethic:
Religions (1993).

Objections

The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s
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The corruption claim is, as we’ve seen, necessarily
parasitic on some conception of the good that is allegedly
being corrupted.

So any claim of corruption of religion

must be parasitic on a claim about the good of religion –
or, as we’ve seen, about the cluster of claims that
constitute that good.
The persuasiveness of the corruption claim that I have
formulated here therefore depends on the contingency that
you, my audience, agree that there is a genuine good in
what I am trying to protect.

If you think that there is

some deep and enduring source of value in the cluster of
ends I’ve described, and you think that the state is likely
to choose badly if it is called upon to determine the
relative merits of the ends within the cluster, or of the
particular avenues by which any of these ends are pursued,
then you have reason to want the state to define religion
as a good in precisely the way that I’ve described here.
And, for the reasons I have given, that will entail, among
other things, a hands-off rule.
The argument I have offered gives rise to obvious
objections.

I will consider three.

First, one might

object that the conception of “religion” I have offered is
not specific enough, protecting some activities that are
worthless.

Second, one might object that it is too
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specific, unfairly privileging some activities over other
equally valuable ones.

Finally, one could claim that the

entire approach is misguided, because it is not appropriate
to use such a contestable conception of the good as
“religion,” even defined as capaciously as I have proposed,
in an argument for any particular deployment of political
power.
The first objection has been developed by Timothy
Macklem.

Recall that Greenawalt and others have argued

that “religion” should be given its conventional meaning,
as denoting a set of activities united only by a family
resemblance, with no set of necessary or sufficient
conditions demarcating the boundaries of the set.

My

proposal follows and elaborates Greenawalt’s claim.
Macklem objects that the question of what “religion”
conventionally means is a semantic one, but the question of
what beliefs are entitled to special treatment is a moral
one, and it requires a moral rather than a semantic
answer.349
Macklem’s analytical point is sound.

But there are

powerful reasons for denying the state the power to judge
the objective value of particular religions.

Macklem

himself inadvertently displays those reasons when he
349

Timothy Macklem, Independence of Mind 120-26 (2006).
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proposes that courts undertake "a frank examination of the
contribution that any doctrine held on the basis of faith,
be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable of making
to well-being."350

In a pluralistic society, there are

obvious dangers in giving judges the power to assign legal
consequences to different religious beliefs based on the
judges' own conceptions of well-being.

Macklem’s own

confident withholding of protection from “cults” is not
reassuring.351

The decision to define religion vaguely,

relying on the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself rests on
moral grounds.
David Richards has developed the second objection,
attacking Greenawalt from the opposite direction by arguing
that common-sense conceptions of religion “hopelessly track
often unprincipled and ad hoc majoritarian intuitions of
‘proper’ or ‘real’ religion.”352
corruption argument:

This is a version of the

the majoritarian intuitions he

describes will distort the exercise of the individual
conscience, which is the truly valuable thing that the
disestablishment of religion ought to protect.
objection is the same as Macklem’s:

the question of what

to protect is a moral, not a semantic one.

350
351
352

His

While Macklem

Id. at 142.
Id.
See Richards, supra note 260, at 142.
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would narrow protection, however, Richards would broaden
it.

Richards has argued that the moral basis of the free

exercise clause is “a negative liberty immunizing from
state coercion the exercise of the conceptions of a life
well and ethically lived and expressive of a mature
person’s rational and reasonable powers.”353

His broadly

libertarian account entails that “the right to conscience
protects the sphere of action when state intervention
therein is not justified by the protection of all-purpose
goods.”354

For Richards, conscientious objections to law

need not be based on morality or religion; it is enough
that they arise out of the agent’s exercise of his
practical reason.

This, he acknowledges, entails

constitutional protection for “everything and anything.”355
The concerns that motivate Richards’s philosophy are
rooted in his own experience as a young gay man in the
1960s and 1970s, when he took major professional risks in
order to be forthright and truthful about his sexuality.
He was an early and courageous defender of gay rights at a
time when most gay academics were deeply closeted and
terrified of writing about these issues.356

The right to

353

Id. at 140.
Id. at 144.
355
Id. at 141.
356
He describes his personal history in David A.J. Richards, The Case
for Gay Rights (2005). Richards’s position on the scope of the
354
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conscience, he argues, protects “our moral autonomy in
acknowledging the ethical principles that both define
personal integrity and give shape indissolubly to the unity
of belief and action that is one’s life.”357

It is hard to

see whose claims would be excluded by this principle:
men who are less earnest and serious than Richards?

gay

The

unserious gay man is also exercising his rational and
reasonable powers.

Richards himself is driven by concerns

of a moral depth that his principle fails to capture.358
The problem with any claim that purports to insulate
all human conduct from state interference is that a rule
that nominally protects everything in fact protects
nothing.

There are indeed plural values of great weight.

Religion does not outweigh all other human concerns.

But

there is no way to operationalize a rule that one must

religion clauses is followed by Laura Underkuffler-Freund, The
Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge
to First Amendment Theory, 36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 837 (1995), who cites
him with approval at p. 963.
357
Richards, supra note 260, at 144.
358
Moral seriousness is more salient in Joseph Raz’s otherwise similar
account of the reasons to protect conscientious objection. Raz thinks
that the case for accommodating conscientious objectors depends on
self-definition: “The areas of a person’s life and plans which have to
be respected by others are those which are central to his own image of
the kind of person he is and which form the foundation of his selfrespect.” Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and
Morality 280 (1979). This understanding goes beyond religion or
conscience. “A law preventing dedicated novelists from pursuing their
vocation with the freedom essential to it is bad, and bad for the same
reasons, as a law conscripting pacifists to the army.” Id. at 281.
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protect all deeply valuable activities.

All one can do is

enumerate and protect them one at a time.359
The deepest objection to what I have proposed is
Rawlsian.

“[O]ur exercise of political power is fully

proper,” Rawls argues, “only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all
citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to
their common human reason.”360

The basic idea of political

liberalism, as noted earlier, is that people with different
comprehensive conceptions of the good can and should reach
an “overlapping consensus” on the principles of political
cooperation.

They may disagree about the ultimate

foundations of the political principles that govern them,
but they agree upon the principles, those principles are
moral ones, and they are affirmed on moral grounds.361
A common ground strategy entails endless political
struggle.

The common ground is contingent and subject to

continuing negotiation.

The upshot is a messier liberal

theory than the kind attempted by, for example, Rawls.

A

common ground strategy is, from Rawls’s point of view,
costly, because it gives up on the idea of universal civic

359
360
361

See Koppelman, supra note 45.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 137 (expanded ed. 1996).
See id. at 144-50.
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friendship.

That is the deepest problem with the

corruption argument:

it necessarily depends on a

contestable conception of the good – in my formulation, the
value of religion, understood very abstractly - and so can
have no persuasive power to those who do not see any value
in the good that the corruption claim seeks to protect.

On

this basis, Samuel Freeman, one of Rawls’s most prominent
followers and expositors, concludes that public reason
excludes all comprehensive conceptions from public and even
private deliberations about coercive laws.

This is why

“[a]ppeals to Christian doctrine simply do not count as
good public reasons in our political culture.”362

The same

can equally be said of all appeals to the idea that
religion as such is a good to be promoted.
The Rawlsian objection to the claim about the good of
religion that I have formulated here is that some people
reasonably reject it, and that it therefore is not an
appropriate basis for the exercise of political power.

The

idea that the search for meaning in life is good, Martha
Nussbaum writes, “is just a bit too dogmatic.

We live in a

country in which many people are skeptics, doubting that
there is such a thing as the ultimate meaning of life, and

362

Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian
Political Philosophy 201 (2007); see also id. at 200, 220, 224.
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where many others have dogmatic anti-meaning views.

For

government to declare what Koppelman declares goes just a
bit too far for such skeptical and/or anti-metaphysical
views.”363

A regime that treats religion as a good is

illegitimate for the same reason as a regime that treats
Christianity as a good.

It is not a regime “the essentials

of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals
acceptable to their common human reason.”
Since the corruption argument favors religion only by
keeping the state away from it, it does not bias the basic
structure in the ways that concern Rawls.

No one’s life

chances are adversely affected by their holding any
particular religious views.

The favoring of religion by

the corruption argument is in no way inconsistent with
freedom of conscience.

On the contrary, it is one path to

such freedom.
A Rawlsian might still object to the favoring of
religion by rules that disable government from deciding
religious questions, in the way that the rules described at
the beginning of this paper do, because these rules make a
contestable idea of the good into part of the basic
structure.
363

The objection is related to Rawls’s conception

Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 168.

139

of distributive justice.

If government is going to be

concerned with distributive justice at all, then it needs
to know what it is distributing.

One of the distinguishing

marks of a liberal political theory is that it will decline
to specify those goods too precisely:

there are good

reasons for keeping “salvation by Christ” off the list.
Rawls sought to base his own theory of distributive
justice on a thin theory of the good, because he did not
want government deciding any issue of deep value.

In his

final formulation, the primary goods that are the objects
of distributive justice are citizens’ needs understood from
a political point of view.

According to the political

conception, every person has higher-order interests in
developing and exercising his moral powers to develop a
sense of justice and a conception of the good.

Justice

requires “conditions securing for those powers their
adequate development and full exercise.”364

The primary

goods are “essential all-purpose means to realize the
higher-order interests connected with citizens’ moral
powers and their determinate conceptions of the good (so
far as the restrictions on information permit the parties
to know this).”365

364
365

Obviously religion cannot be a primary

Rawls, supra note 360, at 74.
Id. at 76.
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good in this sense; one can exercise one’s moral powers
without religion.

The mere fact that most people value

something highly does not make it a primary good.366
But the thin theory of the good that Rawls lays out is
too parsimonious a basis for human rights.

Aspects of the

person that are not involved in the exercise of the moral
powers may nonetheless be very important.

For example,

Rawls lacks the resources to condemn female genital
mutilation, which does not deprive its victims of their
moral powers or their normal capacities for cooperation.
FGM hurts them in other ways.367

If a fuller conception of

the person and the person’s needs are needed than Rawls
offers, then Rawls is poorly positioned to object to the
inclusion of religious concerns in that catalog of needs.368
Rawls evidently thinks that pure constructivism is the
only reliable path to social unity.

In modern societies,

there is so much normative pluralism that the only

366

Id. at 308.
The argument of the previous two paragraphs is developed in detail in
Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of Constructivism: Rawls, Habermas, and
sex (unpublished ms.).
368
So is Nussbaum. She argues that political respect should be given to
“the faculty with which each person searches for the ultimate meaning
of life,” not its goal, and that we should “agree to respect the
faculty without prejudging the question whether there is a meaning to
be found, or what it might be like.” Nussbaum, supra note 38, at 16869. This effort to be just barely specific enough is a delicate one.
As other critics of Nussbaum have observed, it is not clear how one can
valorize a capability without valorizing what the capability is for.
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values 4146 (2003); Linda Barclay, What Kind of Liberal is Martha Nussbaum?, 4
Sats – Nordic J. Phil. 5, 15-16 (2003).
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overlapping consensus that is consistent with respectful
relations is that constructed without any reference to the
actual normative views of members of society.

That is why

“partially comprehensive” views must be excluded.
Political liberalism, he argues, should be freestanding, so
that it “can be presented without saying, or knowing, or
hazarding a conjecture about, what [comprehensive]
doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by.”369

“[T]he

political conception of justice is worked out first as a
freestanding view that can be justified pro tanto without
looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the
existing comprehensive doctrines.”370

This approach may

possibly work under certain circumstances, but they are
likely to be as unusual as the circumstances in which it is
safe to drive a car while blindfolded.
T.M. Scanlon explains why the strategy of surveying
and finding common ground among actual comprehensive views
would not be satisfactory to Rawls.

“It would be

impossible to survey all possible comprehensive views and
inadequate, in an argument for stability, to consider just
those that are represented in a given society at a given
time since others may emerge at any time and gain

369
370

Rawls, supra note 360, pp. 12-13.
John Rawls, Reply to Habermas, 42 J. Phil. 132, 145 (1995).
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adherents.”371

On the other hand, as the persistence of the

corruption argument over the past 350 years shows, a
consensus built around the convergence of a contingent set
of actual views may last for quite some time.

VII.

Understanding the Rules

Return to the Establishment Clause rules that we had
trouble explaining at the outset:

no endorsement of

religion; no discrimination against particular religious
practices; laws must have secular purposes; courts will not
resolve controversies over religious doctrine.

They are

not well tailored to prevent division or alienation.

How

will these be appreciably worsened if, say, a court awards
property to a claimant after a showing that the opposing
party has departed from church doctrine?372

If the purpose

of the Establishment Clause is to prevent corruption of
religion, on the other hand, all of these rules make sense.
The central evil is actions of the government that are
intended to manipulate the religious beliefs of the
citizens.

That’s why the state can’t engage in speech

endorsing religious propositions, employ religious tests,

371

T.M. Scanlon, Rawls on Justification, in The Cambridge Companion to
Rawls 164 (Samuel Freeman, ed., 2003).
372
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or enact laws which are tantamount to endorsement of
religious propositions because they have no secular
purpose.

Discrimination among religions is likewise an

effort to interfere in the development of religious
doctrine.

An obvious corollary is the state’s incompetence

to resolve controversies over religious doctrine.

“[T]he

government may not displace the free religious choices of
its citizens by placing its weight behind a particular
religious belief, tenet, or sect.”373
An obvious implication of the corruption argument is
that the state may not declare religious truth.374

All of

the religious practices that the authors considered here
objected to had this as a common element.

To review:

Milton opposed the censorship of heresy and the payment of
clergy by the Crown.

Roger Williams objected to similar

practices in colonial Massachusetts.
repression of religious dissenters.

Locke opposed the
Pufendorf wrote

against Louis XIV’s repression of Protestantism.

Elisha

Williams opposed a law banning ministers from preaching
373

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 733
(1976)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Tribe observes that all nine of the
justices in this case agreed with this proposition. Tribe, supra note
23, at 1240.
374
I set this premise forth as axiomatic in Secular Purpose, supra note
6. Some writers have observed that this premise was inadequately
defended in that article. Michael J. Perry, What Do the Free Exericse
and Nonestablishment Norms Forbid? Reflections on the Constitutional
Law of Religious Freedom, 1 U. of St. Thomas L. J. 549, 570-72 (2003);
Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625, 63436 (2003). The present article is, in part, a response.
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outside their parishes.

Backus and Leland fought religious

taxes and the jailing of unlicensed preachers.
opposed religious coercion and taxation.

Jefferson

Madison opposed

nonpreferential support for churches.
Official declarations of religious truth raise
recurring, core concerns of the corruption argument:

that

the state will manipulate religion to serve its own,
decidedly nonreligious ends; that citizens will be induced
to profess the state’s religious line in order to curry
official favor; that the state will meddle in matters of
great importance, with respect to which it is incompetent
and untrustworthy.
The core Establishment Clause violation, from the
perspective of the corruption argument, is action by the
state that intentionally manipulates religion to serve
official ends.

Actions that have the incidental and

unintended effect of advancing or inhibiting particular
religious ideas present more ambiguous cases, and so it is
harder to say what the corruption argument implies about
them.

It happens that the boundary that separates clear

from contested issues in Establishment Clause doctrine runs
along precisely these lines.
areas of clarity.

We have already reviewed the

Now consider the field of uncertainty.
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Three questions dominate contemporary religion clause
scholarship. First, should religiously based exemptions
from generally applicable laws be determined by the courts
or the legislatures?375 Second, is it appropriate for
citizens to seek to enact laws based on their religious
beliefs?376 And third, may government directly fund

375
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religious activity, so long as the principle that
determines who gets the funding is not itself religious?377
With respect to the first question, almost everyone
agrees that exemptions, such as excusing Quakers from
military service, are permissible.

The hard and hotly

disputed question is whether those exemptions should be
made by the legislature or the judiciary.

That is a

question of comparative institutional competence, and the
corruption argument says nothing about it.

The corruption

argument, as we have noted, presupposes that religion is in
some way a good thing.

That presupposition offers the way

out of the free exercise/establishment dilemma.
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corruption argument is thus not inconsistent with religious
accommodation, which rests on the same premise.
The concern about religious accommodation that the
corruption argument highlights is that accommodation can
sometimes be an occasion of hypocrisy.

From its earliest

formulations, the corruption argument has rested on the
premise that only genuinely felt religious activity has
value; a persistent objection to Establishment has been
that it produces feigned and therefore worthless religion.
Exemptions can produce such hypocrisy.

But this is a

reason for being selective in making accommodations
available, so that they are given more stingily when they
involve some substantial secular benefit.

It is not a

reason to reject exemptions as such.
As for the second question, the corruption argument is
not, in any way, an argument that it is inappropriate for
citizens to vote based on their religious beliefs.

Its

concern is that the coercive power of the state will be
deployed to manipulate the religious beliefs of the
citizens, not that the citizens’ political behavior will be
influenced by their own beliefs.

It comes into play only

when the state enacts a law that lacks a secular purpose
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and so is tantamount to an official declaration of
religious truth.378
Finally, there is the question of funding for
religious activity.

Here it matters crucially whether the

state is making a religious determination when it provides
the support.

If it is making such a determination, then it

is violating the core prohibition of declaration of
religious truth, and concerns about corruption come to the
fore.

If it is not, then the issue is, as with the

exemption question, whether incentives for hypocrisy and
pressure on religious minorities is being created.379

That

is a question of fact, and so the corruption argument has
no clear implications about the question.
What about ceremonial deism?

Questions of religious

doctrine are in fact directly addressed by the placement of
“In God We Trust” on currency, or “under God” in the Pledge
of Allegiance.

The Court has sometimes claimed that these

practices are not really religious, but that is a silly

378
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Here I am basically in agreement with the analysis offered in
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at 198-239. The gap in their
analysis, one on which they do not dwell, is that no constitutional
issue is raised if pressure is placed on other ideological minorities,
such as racists. Their argument implicitly singles out religion for
special treatment without admitting that that is what it is doing. See
Koppelman, supra note 45.
379
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argument, since they are overtly and conspicuously
religious.380
The general rule now seems to be that old forms of
deism are grandfathered, but newer ones are
unconstitutional.

As noted earlier, Justice Breyer, in the

recent Ten Commandments cases, invalidated a recent display
while upholding an older one.

Justice O’Connor, in her

concurrence in the Pledge of Allegiance case,381 explicitly
made the age of a ceremonial acknowledgement relevant to
its constitutionality.

She thought that constitutionality

was supported by the absence of worship or prayer, the
absence of reference to a particular religion, and minimal
religious content.

But the first of her factors was

“history and ubiquity.”

“The constitutional value of

ceremonial deism turns on a shared understanding of its
legitimate nonreligious purposes,” O’Connor wrote.

“That

sort of understanding can exist only when a given practice
has been in place for a significant portion of the Nation's
history, and when it is observed by enough persons that it
can fairly be called ubiquitous.”382

The consequence is to

make old and familiar forms of ceremonial deism
constitutional, but to discourage innovation.
380
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382
Id. at 37.
381
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There are two aspects of this area of the law that
distinguish it.
The first is that it represented a common ground
strategy - an effort, in its own time, to understand
“religion” in an ecumenical and nonsectarian way.

At the

time that these elements of civil religion were put in
place, the existence of God appeared to be the one aspect
of religion that was common to the various religious
factions then dominant in American life.

This was true of

the vague deism embraced in the Declaration of Independence
and the speeches of the Presidents, beginning with
Washington; it was also true of the idea of a “JudeoChristian” ethic that was invented in the 1950s.383

This

old settlement is part of the background in which
contemporary American religion has developed.

Its

continuation is not an effort by an incumbent
administration to manipulate religion.

It simply

recognizes that people are invested, in some cases very
deeply, in the status quo.384
Of course, ceremonial deism has an effect on religion.
It produces a culture in which many people feel that their
383
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384
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religious beliefs are somehow associated with patriotism.
This has the salutary effect of fostering civic unity and
common moral ideals and tempering religious fanaticism.

It

also has the less attractive effect of encouraging selfrighteous nationalism and the idea that whatever the United
States does, however repugnant, is somehow divinely
sanctioned.385

What matters for present purposes is that

neither of these effects is specifically aimed at by
government when it perpetuates these rituals.
manipulation, in that sense, is not occurring.

Political
Some

writers have argued that government should aim to minimize
its effect on religion, but that goal is not a coherent
one:

any government actions at all will cause religion to

be different from what it otherwise would have been.386
Today, on the other hand, the invocation of theism,
and specifically the erection of a Ten Commandments
display, is an intervention in the bitterest religious
controversies that now divide us.387

Douglas Laycock thinks

that a lesson of O’Connor’s opinion is that “separationist
385
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groups should sue immediately when they encounter any
religious practice newly sponsored by the government.”388
That is precisely the right lesson for them to take.

New

sponsorship of religious practices is far more likely to
represent a contemporaneous effort to intervene in a live
religious controversy than the perpetuation of old forms.389
There is one more aspect of the corruption argument
that needs to be considered.
paradoxical aspect of all:

This may be the most

the argument, even if it plays

a powerful role in Establishment Clause theory, cannot be
directly relied upon to decide cases.

If a court tries to

decide whether corruption has occurred in any particular
case, it must first decide what a non-corrupted religion
looks like.

And that will itself violate the Establishment

Clause.
Justice Souter, the principal modern proponent of the
corruption rationale, has fallen squarely into this trap.390

388
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For a similar conclusion, see Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 26, at
147.
390
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Dissenting in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,391 in which the
Court upheld a program that allowed parents to pay
religious school tuition with state-funded vouchers, he
cited the risk of corruption described by Madison.
declared:

“The risk is already being realized.”392

Then he
He

noted the decisions of many religious schools to comply
with the Ohio program’s requirements that schools not
discriminate on the basis of religion, nor “teach hatred of
any person or group on the basis of ... religion.”
Kevin Pybas observes that Justice Souter’s argument
amounts to “an accusation that the religious have been
unfaithful to their God and to what their God requires of
them.”393

Pybas is entirely correct to belabor Souter with

the familiar concern about the limits of state competence:
“how does Justice Souter know when a particular religious
community has compromised its principles?

Is he or the

Court generally so well-versed in the theologies of the
various religious traditions in this country that he or it
is in a position to say to a religious community that it
has violated its own principles?”394

391
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Souter’s error shows that, even if the corruption
rationale is accepted, it cannot be operationalized as a
requirement that courts look for corruption in particular
cases.

It is rather a reason for the state to avoid making

any religious determinations at all.395
Souter offers a more telling objection to the voucher
program’s restrictions when he observes that the ban on
teaching “hatred” itself raises religious questions.

This

condition, he notes, “could be understood (or subsequently
broadened) to prohibit religions from teaching
traditionally legitimate articles of faith as to the error,
sinfulness, or ignorance of others.”396

Any such

understanding might violate the hands-off rule, for the
same reason that it was violated by the charge of fraud
against Edna and Donald Ballard for claiming that St.
Germain had given them extraordinary healing powers.397
Claiming that the Christian religion is the only path to
salvation and that all nonChristians are damned may or may
not constitute “hatred.”

It is not clear how a state can

decide that without getting into forbidden questions of
395
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396
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theology.

For example, a religious group might argue that

its claims about the damnation of nonbelievers reflects
loving concern rather than hatred.

How could a state

respond to that?
This objection is not fatal to the program, however,
since the “hatred” proviso does not unambiguously require
this result.

A familiar canon of statutory construction

holds that ambiguous laws are not to be read in a way that
renders them unconstitutional.398

Federal courts are also

not to adjudicate the constitutionality of ambiguous state
laws before the state courts have the opportunity to
interpret them.399

For the same reason that a court can’t

decide whether the Ballards’s religious claim is
fraudulent, it can’t decide whether such a claim is
hateful.

If Ohio were to read its hatred proviso in the

way Souter suggests, that would raise constitutional
difficulties.

It hasn’t happened yet, however, so it can’t

be an argument against the law’s constitutionality.

Conclusion

398
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The corruption argument was once the basis for a
political consensus among people with radically differing
religious views.

They agreed that religion was valuable,

and that it was likely to be damaged by state efforts to
manipulate it.

The same understanding underlies much of

modern Establishment Clause doctrine.

When the Court

invalidated a prayer that New York State had composed for
public school classrooms, it declared that “[i]t is neither
sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each separate
government in this country should stay out of the business
of writing or sanctioning official prayers and leave that
purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look to for religious
guidance.”400

This vision of the Establishment Clause is

worth reviving.
Citizens do need to share an understanding of what is
valuable.

But when the details of this particular Valuable

Something are so hotly disputed, the most effective way for
government to pay it reverence is just to shut up about it.
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